电子商务中“羊毛党”行为的经济法规制研究

Research on the Economic Law Regulation of “Yangmaodang” Behavior in E-Commerce

摘要: 数字经济背景下，平台促销规则与算法运营不断精细化，“羊毛党”由零散的优惠利用演化为组织化、职业化甚至产业化的规则套利与技术攻击，持续冲击平台治理与公平竞争秩序。与将其简单归入个别民事纠纷或单一刑事犯罪不同，本文从经济法“社会本位”与秩序维护立场出发，主张将其作为破坏平台市场机制的新型不正当竞争风险加以类型化识别与系统规制。文章在梳理国内外研究与我国执法司法困境的基础上，围绕“行为类型–规范适用–责任配置–治理工具”展开分析，提出以竞争秩序为中心、以平台分级义务为抓手、以跨部门协同与证据规则为支撑的综合治理路径，以实现“预防优先、惩戒兜底”的制度目标。

Abstract: Against the backdrop of the digital economy, platform promotional rules and algorithmic operations have become increasingly sophisticated. In this context, “yangmaodang”—a term referring to individuals or groups that exploit platform rules, promotional mechanisms, and technical loopholes for improper gains—have evolved from sporadic bargain seekers into organized, professionalized, and even industrialized actors engaging in rule arbitrage and technical attacks. Their activities have continuously undermined platform governance and the order of fair competition. Rather than simply categorizing such conduct as isolated civil disputes or single criminal offenses, this paper, from the perspective of the “social standard” orientation and order-maintenance function of economic law, argues that “yangmaodang” should be identified and regulated as a new type of unfair competition risk that disrupts platform market mechanisms. Based on a review of relevant domestic and international studies, as well as the practical dilemmas in China’s law enforcement and judicial practice, this paper examines the issue along the analytical framework of “types of conduct-application of legal norms-allocation of liabilities-governance instruments”. It further proposes a comprehensive regulatory approach centered on competition order, grounded in graded platform obligations, and supported by cross-departmental coordination and evidentiary rules, with a view to achieving the institutional objective of “prevention first, with punishment as a last resort”.