人工智能的“无身性”困境——一种具身认知哲学的批判与出路
The Dilemma of “Disembodiment” in Artificial Intelligence—A Critique and Way Forward from Embodied Cognition Philosophy
摘要: 当今人工智能技术迅速发展,在各个领域都有着广泛的应用,但其在符号处理与模式识别上的卓越能力却与其在理解、适应与价值创造层面的深刻局限构成了鲜明反差。本文的核心论点是,这一矛盾根植于AI存在论层面的“无身性”,这构成了其智能不可逾越的哲学界限。为论证此观点,研究首先将具身认知理论重构为批判标尺,澄明“现象身体”作为意义生成之基;继而,以此为据,系统诊断出AI无身性所导致的、具有内在逻辑递进关系的三重哲学症候:认识论上的符号空转导致意义理解缺失,存在论上的规则盲视引发在世行动无能,并最终表现为价值论上的模拟失根,使得情感伦理沦为无源之水。这组症候反过来确证了人类具身认知的生成性、情境性与人文性之不可替代价值。基于此,本文最终推导出一种规范性的人机共生框架,其核心在于坚守“人类作为意义锚点”的根本原则,并将AI严格限定为“人类可控的工具延伸”,据此划定技术应用的伦理边界,旨在为技术时代捍卫人的主体性与生活世界的意义完整性提供哲学奠基。
Abstract: Contemporary artificial intelligence technology has developed rapidly and found extensive applications across various fields. However, its remarkable capabilities in symbolic processing and pattern recognition stand in stark contrast to its profound limitations in comprehension, adaptation, and value creation. The core argument of this paper is that this contradiction stems from the ontological “disembodiment” of AI, which constitutes an insurmountable philosophical boundary for its intelligence. To support this claim, the study first reconstructs embodied cognition theory as a critical framework, clarifying the “phenomenal body” as the foundation of meaning generation. Subsequently, based on this framework, it systematically diagnoses three philosophically symptomatic issues inherent to AI’s disembodiment, which follow an intrinsic logical progression: epistemological “symbolic emptiness” leading to a lack of meaning comprehension, ontological “rule-blindness” resulting in an incapacity for worldly action, and ultimately, axiological “simulated rootlessness,” which reduces emotion and ethics to a soulless abstraction. These symptoms collectively reaffirm the irreplaceable value of human embodied cognition—its generative, situated, and humanistic nature. Building on this analysis, the paper ultimately proposes a normative framework for human-machine symbiosis. Its core principle is to uphold “human beings as the anchor of meaning” and strictly confine AI to the role of “a human-controllable tool extension.” This approach delineates ethical boundaries for technological application, aiming to provide a philosophical foundation for defending human subjectivity and the integrity of meaning in the lifeworld in the technological age.
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