指称与认知

Reference and Cognition

摘要: 本文针对分析哲学中长期存在的“空名”指称难题(如“福尔摩斯”、“孙悟空”等)，系统梳理并批判了描述主义与直接指称论的传统解决方案及其局限。文章指出，二者共享“指称功能单一”的预设，导致在解释空名时，要么预设不存在的实体，要么使语句的意义失去完整性。为超越二者所共同的预设，本文创造性地质疑了“空名指称什么”这一经典问题本身，将其重构为“当指称意向因对象不存在而失败时，意义如何可能被把握与系统性地生成？”。基于此，文章综合约翰·塞尔的意向性理论、后期维特根斯坦的“语言游戏”学说及认知科学的框架理论，建构了一个全新的“双层语义–语用整合模型”。

Abstract: This paper systematically reviews and critiques the traditional solutions of descriptivism and direct reference theory, along with their limitations, in addressing the long-standing problem of “empty names and reference” in analytic philosophy (e.g., “Sherlock Holmes,” “Sun Wukong”). It argues that both approaches share a presupposition of a “unitary function of reference,” which, when applied to empty names, either posits non-existent entities or undermines the integrity of meaning in statements. To transcend this shared presupposition, the paper creatively calls into question the classic question of “what empty names refer to” and reframes it as: “When referential intentions fail due to the non-existence of the object, how can meaning be grasped and systematically generated?” Building on this, the paper synthesizes John Searle’s theory of intentionality, the later Wittgenstein’s concept of “language games,” and insights from cognitive science’s framework theory to construct a novel “two-tiered semantic-pragmatic integration model.”