非国有股东治理参与、融资约束与国有企业创新
Non-State Shareholder Governance Participation, Financing Constraints, and Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises
摘要: 在我国经济迈向高质量发展的背景下,提升国有企业创新能力具有重要现实意义。本文从股权参与和董事会参与两个角度,利用2013~2024年沪深两市国有上市公司数据,研究了非国有股东治理参与对国有企业创新的影响。得到研究结论如下:非国有股东治理参与与国有企业创新呈现正相关关系,即非国有股东持股比例和非国有股东委派董事比例的提高,能够促进国有企业的创新。进一步分析发现,这一促进作用在融资约束较小、小规模和高成长性企业中更为显著;并且非国有股东治理参与更有助于提升实质性创新水平,而对策略性创新的促进作用相对有限。本文表明,非国有股东治理参与是提升国有企业创新水平的重要治理因素。研究结论为理解混合所有制改革的创新效应提供了新的经验证据,也为完善国有企业治理机制、激发企业创新活力提供了政策启示。
Abstract: Against the backdrop of China’s economy advancing toward high-quality development, enhancing the innovation capabilities of state-owned enterprises holds significant practical importance. This study examines the impact of non-state shareholder governance participation on SOE innovation from two perspectives—equity participation and board participation—using data from state-owned listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2024. The findings reveal that non-state shareholder governance participation positively correlates with SOE innovation. Specifically, higher non-state shareholder ownership and a greater proportion of directors appointed by non-state shareholders promote innovation within SOEs. Further analysis reveals that this promotional effect is more pronounced in enterprises with lower financing constraints, smaller scale, and higher growth potential. Moreover, non-state shareholder governance participation is more effective in enhancing substantive innovation levels, while its promotional effect on strategic innovation is relatively limited. This study demonstrates that non-state shareholder governance participation is a crucial governance factor in elevating the innovation level of state-owned enterprises. The findings provide new empirical evidence for understanding the innovation effects of mixed-ownership reform and offer policy implications for improving the governance mechanisms of state-owned enterprises and stimulating their innovative vitality.
文章引用:徐晓婧. 非国有股东治理参与、融资约束与国有企业创新[J]. 可持续发展, 2026, 16(4): 58-69. https://doi.org/10.12677/sd.2026.164134

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