在世与超越——论海德格尔对康德“世界”概念的存在论重构
Being-in-the-World and Transcendence—On Heidegger’s Ontological Reconstruction of Kant’s Concept of “World”
摘要: 传统形而上学将“世界”理解为现成存在者的总和或物理时空的容器。康德通过先验理念将其提升为现象的绝对整体,但其认识论框架仍限定在表象的边界内。海德格尔通过此在分析论发起了对传统“世界”概念的生存论解构,证明世界并非外在的、有待证明的客观实在,而是此在存在的基本结构“在–世界–之中–存在”。世界在此并非对象的集合,而是由意蕴构成的、先行开展的意义关系整体,在日常操劳中以上手状态呈现,并在用具指引的整体性中显现其“世界性”。海德格尔进而通过对“超越”概念的存在论重释,将世界界定为此在超越的“何所向”,是意义整体通过此在的筹划而开启的敞开境域。由此,海德格尔不仅解构了康德世界概念的现成性与客体性残余,更将“世界”从认识论的总体理念重构为存在论意义上的生存境域,实现了从先验认识论向基础存在论的转向。
Abstract: Traditional metaphysics conceives the “world” as the aggregate of ready-to-hand entities or as a container of physical space and time. Kant elevated it through transcendental ideas to the absolute totality of phenomena, yet his epistemological framework remained confined within the boundaries of representation. Through his analysis of “Dasein”, Heidegger initiated an ontological deconstruction of the traditional concept of “world”, demonstrating that the world is not an external, objectively verifiable reality, but rather the fundamental existential structure of “Dasein”—“Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-sein)”. Here, the world is not an assemblage of objects but a pre-unfolded totality of meaningful relations constituted by signification. It presents itself in a ready-to-hand state within everyday activity and reveals its “worldliness” through the totality guided by tools. Furthermore, through an ontological reinterpretation of the concept of “transcendence”, Heidegger defines the world as the “towards-which” of Dasein’s transcendence—an open realm inaugurated by the totality of meaning through Dasein’s projective activity. Thus, Heidegger not only deconstructed the ready-made and object-oriented remnants of Kant’s world concept but also reconfigured “world” from an epistemological totality into an ontological existential horizon, achieving a shift from transcendental epistemology to fundamental ontology.
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