有限性何以成为客观性的条件——哈拉维情境化知识论的认识论重构

How Partiality Becomes a Condition of Objectivity—The Epistemological Reconstruction of Haraway’s Theory of Situated Knowledges

摘要: 传统科学哲学将客观性奠基于主体的隐身与价值的悬置，这一理想在历史主义批判与女性主义认识论的双重追问下陷入困境。哈拉维的情境化知识论提出一个反直觉的回应，有限性不是客观性的障碍，而是其成立的前提。本文分析实证主义与相对主义路径的内在困难，阐释哈拉维如何通过局部视角的优先性、认识客体的能动性与客观性的责任化重铸将有限性转化为客观性的条件，考察视角、定位与衍射三重机制的运作方式，并讨论这一方案的理论推进及尚存的实践困难。

Abstract: Traditional philosophy of science grounds objectivity in the erasure of the subject and the suspension of values. This ideal has been thrown into crisis under the dual interrogation of historicist critique and feminist epistemology. Haraway’s theory of situated knowledges offers a counter-intuitive response: partiality is not an obstacle to objectivity but the very precondition for it. This article analyzes the internal difficulties of both the positivist and the relativist paths, explicates how Haraway recasts partiality as a condition of objectivity through the priority of partial perspective, the agency of the object of knowledge, and the reforging of objectivity as accountability, examines the workings of the triple mechanism of perspective, positioning, and diffraction, and discusses both the theoretical advances and the remaining practical difficulties of this proposal.