论康德批判哲学中的“理性需求”

On the “Rational Need” in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

摘要: 1770年代，德国思想界爆发了雅可比与门德尔松围绕莱辛的斯宾诺莎立场展开的泛神论之争，康德于1786年发表了《何谓在思维中确定方向》一文，由此介入到争论之中。在文章中，康德聚焦于“理性需求”以及与之密切相关的“理性信念”这两个概念，一方面批判了雅可比诉诸非理性直观来通达超感性对象的神秘主义思想，一方面批判了门德尔松诉诸理性知识来通达超感性对象的独断论思想。康德指出，人的理性因自觉到其不足而产生对超感性对象的主观需求，对于这一需求的满足最终则只能落实为一种理论上不足而实践上必要的理性信念。康德的思考不仅为解决雅可比与门德尔松之争提供了一条中间道路，同时也鲜明地体现出其批判哲学思想的实践旨趣。

Abstract: In the 1770s, when the pantheistic controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn over Lessing’s Spinoza position broke out in German intellectual circles, Kant intervened in the debate with his 1786 essay, “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” In his essay, Kant focuses on the concept of “rational need” and the closely related concept of “rational belief,” criticising Jacobi’s mystical idea of appealing to irrational intuition to reach supersensible objects on the one hand, and Mendelssohn’s dogmatical idea of appealing to rational knowledge to reach supersensible objects on the other. Kant points out that the subjective need of human reason for supersensible objects arises from the consciousness of its insufficiency, and the fulfilment of this need can only be realised in the form of a theoretically insufficient but practically necessary rational belief. Kant’s thinking not only provides a middle way to solve the dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, but also clearly reflects the practical interest of his critical philosophy.