马克思“主体自我意识”观从批判到建构——基于《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》

Marx’s Conception of “Subjective Self-Consciousness”: From Critique to Construction —A Study Based on the Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

摘要: 《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》是马克思从思辨哲学转向现实批判的标志性文本。马克思以宗教批判为切入点，以“现实性”为核心立场，批判黑格尔、费尔巴哈以及青年黑格尔派所代表的非现实“主体自我意识”观。在此基础上，马克思建构起以“群众”范畴为载体，以“理论批判与人的高度的革命的辩证统一”为路径，以“人的解放”为指向，突破了德国传统抽象阐释局限的“主体自我意识”观。尽管受到马克思早期思想语境的制约，该观念仍带有人本主义痕迹，但其“主体自我意识”观的现实化建构，对后续马克思主体思想发展产生了重要影响。

Abstract: The Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right serves as a landmark text marking Marx’s transition from speculative philosophy to the critique of reality. Taking the critique of religion as his point of departure and “reality” as his core standpoint, Marx critiques the unreal conception of “subjective self-consciousness” represented by Hegel, Feuerbach, and the Young Hegelians. On this basis, Marx constructs a conception of “subjective self-consciousness” that takes the category of “the masses” as its carrier, the “dialectical unity of theoretical critique and the revolution of human heights” as its path, and “human emancipation” as its orientation, thereby transcending the limitations of the abstract interpretations of German tradition. Although constrained by the context of Marx’s early thought and retaining traces of humanism, the actualized construction of his conception of “subjective self-consciousness” exerted a significant influence on the subsequent development of his thought on the subject.