动态奖惩机制下“直播+”电商供应链的演化博弈与协同效应研究

Research on the Evolutionary Game and Synergistic Effects in “Live Streaming+” E-Commerce Supply Chains under Dynamic Incentive-Penalty Mechanisms

摘要: 随着“直播+”电商的快速发展，供应链主体间的利益博弈与协同治理问题日益凸显。基于演化博弈理论，构建平台监管部门与直播主播的双主体动态奖惩机制模型，系统分析四种机制下的系统演化路径与平衡点稳定性，并探讨奖惩力度对平台积极监管概率与主播合规经营概率的影响。研究发现：静态奖惩机制下系统呈周期波动且无稳定均衡；动态惩罚机制可促使系统螺旋收敛至稳定点，其中动态奖励–动态惩罚机制激励效应最强，能显著提升平台监管持续性与主播合规水平；惩罚力度对双方行为具有显著且持续的促进作用，奖励力度短期激励明显但缺乏长期稳定性，二者需协同设计以避免策略退化；平台监管强度对主播合规经营存在非线性门槛效应，跨越临界值可实现协同增效。研究揭示了动态奖惩机制在直播电商供应链治理中的双刃剑效应，为平台优化内部治理规则、行业协会与政府制定分级分类奖惩政策提供了定量依据，也为“直播+”电商供应链实现高质量、可信赖与可持续发展提供了理论支撑与实践指引。

Abstract: With the rapid development of “live-streaming+” e-commerce, the problems of interest competition and collaborative governance among supply chain participants have become increasingly prominent. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper builds a two-party dynamic reward and punishment model involving platform regulators and live-streaming hosts. It systematically analyzes the evolutionary paths and stability of equilibrium under four mechanisms, and discusses how reward and punishment intensity affect the probability of active platform supervision and compliant operation by hosts. The study finds that under static reward and punishment mechanisms, the system fluctuates periodically without stable equilibrium. Dynamic punishment can make the system converge spirally to a stable point, and the combined dynamic reward-dynamic punishment mechanism has the strongest incentive effect, which significantly improves the sustainability of platform supervision and the compliance level of hosts. Punishment intensity has a significant and lasting positive effect on both parties’ behavior, while reward intensity works obviously in the short term but lacks long-term stability. Therefore, rewards and punishments should be designed together to avoid strategy degradation. In addition, platform supervision intensity has a nonlinear threshold effect on hosts’ compliance, and synergistic effects can be achieved when the threshold is crossed. This research reveals the double-edged effect of dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms in the governance of live-streaming e-commerce supply chains. It provides a quantitative basis for platforms to optimize internal governance rules and for industry associations and governments to formulate graded reward and punishment policies. It also offers theoretical support and practical guidance for the high-quality, reliable and sustainable development of “live-streaming+” e-commerce supply chains.