直播电商生态体系治理演化博弈
Evolutionary Game of Ecosystem Governance of Live Streaming E-Commerce
DOI: 10.12677/ecl.2026.154454, PDF,    国家自然科学基金支持
作者: 刘建刚, 石双双:常州大学商学院,江苏 常州
关键词: 演化博弈平台规制直播带货Evolutionary Game Platform Regulation Live-Streaming Commerce
摘要: 本文针对直播电商市场因“底价协议”等机会主义行为引发的乱象,构建了平台、头部主播与政府的三方演化博弈模型,系统分析市场监管治理机制。研究基于演化博弈理论,引入治理成本、声誉损失、流量损失及监管强度等参数,并通过MATLAB进行敏感性分析,揭示各主体趋向均衡的演进路径。结果显示,政府监管强度、补贴及惩罚措施显著影响主播合规行为;平台治理策略则受外部收益、治理成本及政府补贴等多因素驱动。最后,研究提出优化监管策略、提升治理效率等政策建议,为促进行业规范健康发展提供理论依据与实践参考。
Abstract: This study addresses market irregularities in live-streaming e-commerce caused by opportunistic practices like “bottom-price agreements” by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model involving platforms, top-tier streamers, and government regulators. Using evolutionary game theory, the research incorporates parameters such as governance costs, reputation losses, traffic losses, and regulatory intensity, with sensitivity analysis conducted via MATLAB to reveal equilibrium-seeking trajectories of all stakeholders. Findings demonstrate that government regulatory intensity, subsidies, and punitive measures significantly influence streamers’ compliance behaviors, while platform governance strategies are driven by external returns, governance costs, and government subsidies. The study concludes with policy recommendations including optimized regulatory strategies and improved governance efficiency, providing theoretical foundations and practical references for promoting the industry’s standardized and healthy development.
文章引用:刘建刚, 石双双. 直播电商生态体系治理演化博弈[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(4): 772-783. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.154454

参考文献

[1] 费威, 王阔. 直播电商下品牌商与主播的食品安全动态策略分析[J]. 宏观质量研究, 2023, 11(1): 87-98.
[2] 刘建刚, 吴倩, 张美娟. 直播带货平台生态体系平台治理的演化博弈[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(3): 143-154.
[3] Luo, J., Luo, J., Nan, G. and Li, D. (2023) Fake Review Detection System for Online E-Commerce Platforms: A Supervised General Mixed Probability Approach. Decision Support Systems, 175, Article 114045. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[4] Chen, L., Jiang, T., Li, W., Geng, S. and Hussain, S. (2017) Who Should Pay for Online Reviews? Design of an Online User Feedback Mechanism. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 23, 38-44. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[5] 李杰, 张睿, 徐勇. 电商平台监管与商家售假演化博弈[J]. 系统工程学报, 2018, 33(5): 649-661.
[6] 朱立龙, 何慧, 徐艳萍. 协同视角下消费者参与的网购商品质量监管策略研究[J]. 宏观质量研究, 2022, 10(2): 86-99.
[7] Wei, X. and She, Q. (2023) Quantitative Cusp Catastrophe Model to Explore Abrupt Changes in Collaborative Regulation Behavior of E-Commerce Platforms. Information Sciences, 642, Article 119127. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[8] Wu, B., Cheng, J. and Qi, Y. (2020) Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis for “Deceive Acquaintances” Behavior of E-Commerce Platforms in Cooperative Supervision. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 550, Article 123892. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[9] Liu, Y. and Gao, W. (2023) Which Is More Effective for Platform Performance: Punishments or Incentives? Industrial Marketing Management, 110, 117-128. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[10] 董京波. 平台自治的监管问题研究——以平台的双重身份为视角[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2022(7): 70-82.
[11] 沈杨. 虚拟空间治理的再认知: 基于政民关系的分析[J]. 常州大学学报(社会科学版), 2021, 22(5): 21-31.
[12] 张兴刚, 肖旭. 平台市场监管的有效性: 基于演化博弈的分析[J]. 商业研究, 2021(3): 9-17.