基于演化博弈的化妆品安全治理策略研究

Research on Cosmetic Safety Governance Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

摘要: 近年来我国化妆品产业发展迅速，已成为全球第二大化妆品消费市场，但行业扩张过程中暴露出违规生产、第三方检测机构寻租合谋、监管信息不对称等质量安全风险。本文基于演化博弈理论，构建化妆品生产商、第三方检测机构与政府监管部门的三方演化博弈模型，分析博弈各方的策略演化过程、系统演化稳定策略及影响策略选择的关键因素，并通过数值仿真验证参数对演化结果的影响。研究表明，系统存在两组演化稳定策略，其中(合规生产，拒绝寻租，宽松监管)为行业治理的理想稳态，奖惩力度、寻租成本、监管成本是影响策略演化的关键因素，研究结果可为完善化妆品安全监管机制提供理论参考。

Abstract: In recent years, China’s cosmetics industry has developed rapidly and has become the world’s second-largest consumer market for cosmetics. However, during the expansion of the industry, quality and safety risks such as illegal production, rent-seeking collusion by third-party testing agencies, and asymmetric regulatory information have been exposed. This article is based on evolutionary game theory to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model between cosmetics manufacturers, third-party testing agencies, and government regulatory departments. It analyzes the strategic evolution process of each party in the game, the stable strategy of the system evolution, and the key factors affecting strategy selection. The influence of parameters on the evolutionary results is verified through numerical simulation. Research has shown that there are two sets of evolutionary stable strategies in the system, among which (compliant production, refusal of rent-seeking, relaxed regulation) is the ideal steady state of industry governance. The strength of rewards and punishments, rent-seeking costs, and regulatory costs are key factors affecting the evolution of strategies. The research results can provide theoretical references for improving the regulatory mechanism of cosmetics safety.