制造商与零售商的直播引入策略的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Live Streaming Introduction Strategies for Manufacturers and Retailers

摘要: 为解决双渠道供应链中制造商与零售商直播策略选择冲突、渠道利益难以协同的现实问题，明晰双方博弈决策偏好与策略占优规律，本文构建均不直播(NN)、零售商单播(NL)、制造商单播(LN)、双方协同直播(LL)四个博弈情境，采用逆向归纳法求解各场景均衡利润，结合核心参数临界阈值刻画双方策略选择边界。研究表明，制造商与零售商策略偏好存在显著异质性，且均遵循盈利优先、避险兜底的决策准则，消费者直播偏好、平台佣金率、退货成本是否突破临界值，直接决定双方策略选择：参数未达临界时双方均排斥直播，单方突破临界时盈利方主导单播模式，参数达标联合临界后协同直播成为全局最优均衡，其中佣金率与退货成本是影响直播引入策略的核心指标。

Abstract: To address the practical challenges of conflicting live-streaming strategy choices between manufacturers and retailers in a dual-channel supply chain and the difficulty of coordinating channel interests, and to clarify the game decision preferences and strategy dominance rules of the two players, this paper constructs four game models: no live-streaming (NN), retailer-only live-streaming (NL), manufacturer-only live-streaming (LN), and collaborative live-streaming (LL). The backward induction method is used to solve the equilibrium profits for each scenario, and the strategy selection boundaries of the two players are delineated by combining critical thresholds of core parameters. The results show that manufacturers and retailers exhibit significant heterogeneity in their strategic preferences, both adhering to the decision-making principles of profit priority and risk aversion. Whether consumer live-streaming preference, platform commission rate, and return cost break through critical thresholds directly determines the strategy choices of the two players: when parameters fail to reach the thresholds, both parties reject live-streaming; when only one party breaks through the threshold, the profitable party dominates the single-player live-streaming mode; when parameters meet the joint critical thresholds, collaborative live-streaming becomes the globally optimal equilibrium, with commission rate and return cost being the core indicators constraining live-streaming adoption.