伦理学还是存在论？——对海德格尔的尼采批判的一种反驳

Ethics or Ontology?—A Refutation of Heidegger’s Critique of Nietzsche

摘要: 本文以尼采与海德格尔的“罪责”概念之争为枢纽，揭示二者在存在论与伦理学关系问题上的根本分野，并通过文本分析表明：海德格尔对尼采价值学说的批判——指责其囿于形而上学框架而未能触及存在真理——实则是一种带有海德格尔自身哲学预设的选择性重构；这种重构暴露了海德格尔自身存在论延续笛卡尔传统，即将哲学意欲排除于真理领域之外，导致伦理学在第一哲学中的不可能性。相反，尼采通过罪责谱系学解构道德先验性，并以权力意志将价值重奠基于存在自我诠释活动，真正实现了伦理维度向形而上学的复归。本文将通过分析海德格尔重构的动机与后果，揭示其与尼采方案的根本分歧，并最终论证，尼采的方案不仅克服了海德格尔的虚无主义困境，更为后形而上学时代重建哲学规范性提供了伦理存在论基础。

Abstract: This paper centers on the debate between Nietzsche and Heidegger over the concept of “guilt”, revealing their fundamental divergence on the relationship between ontology and ethics. Through textual analysis, it demonstrates that Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s theory of values—namely, the accusation that Nietzsche remains trapped within the framework of metaphysics and thus fails to touch upon the truth of being—is in fact a selective reconstruction informed by Heidegger’s own philosophical presuppositions. This reconstruction reveals that Heidegger's ontology continues the Cartesian tradition of excluding philosophical willing from the domain of truth, thereby rendering ethics impossible within first philosophy. In contrast, Nietzsche, through his genealogy of guilt, deconstructs the transcendental basis of morality and re-grounds values in the self-interpretive activity of existence via the will to power, thereby truly achieving the return of the ethical dimension to metaphysics. By analyzing the motives and consequences of Heidegger’s reconstruction, this paper brings to light the fundamental divergence between his approach and Nietzsche’s project. It ultimately argues that Nietzsche’s approach not only overcomes Heidegger’s predicament of nihilism but also provides an ethical-ontological foundation for reconstructing philosophical normativity in the post-metaphysical era.