高管激励、商业战略与企业所得税规避程度关系研究

Study on the Relationship among theExecutive Incentive, Business Strategy and the Degrees of Enterprise Income Tax Avoidance

摘要: 企业管理者的激励报酬对企业避税行为具有重大影响，管理者在进行避税决策时也会受到企业采用的商业战略的影响。本文研究了高管激励与企业所得税规避程度之间的关系以及不同商业战略模式下二者的关系。研究发现，货币激励会在短期内促进企业所得税的避税，而由于避税成本的存在，在长期范围里，股权激励与企业所得税规避呈负相关关系。研究还发现，采用探索者战略的企业更倾向于规避企业所得税，而采用防御者战略的企业的税避税行为更消极。

Abstract: Executive incentive can exert important influences on corporate tax avoidance behavior, and business strategy also has a significant impact on tax avoidance decision. This paper studies the relationship between the executive incentive and the degrees of enterprise income tax avoidance and different business strategy made of the two. The research suggests that monetary motivation can prompt the company to avoid tax in the short run. However, because of the cost of the tax avoidance, the correlation between the employee stock option and enterprise income tax avoidance is negative in the long run. In addition, the study finds that firms adopting prospector strategy is more preference to avoid enterprise income tax while firms adopting defender strategy is more negative to avoid enterprise income tax.