理性的界限:康德的物自身理论及其影响
The Limits of Reason: Kant’s Theory of Things-in-Themselves and Its Impact
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2026.155211, PDF,   
作者: 盛墨林:中国人民大学哲学院,北京
关键词: 康德显象物自身理性界限Kant Appearance Thing-in-Themselves Limits of Reason
摘要: 康德的物自身理论是其哲学体系中的核心概念。尽管物自身存在,但由于人类的认识能力仅限于感性直观,因此物自身是不可知的。这一理论引发了广泛的学术争议,在德国观念论、新康德主义、康德研究都为接受或克服物自身给出了理由。尽管其本体论地位与认识功能至今仍无定论,但正是通过对这一概念的不断诘问与诠释,其作为人类理性自我批判的边界这一核心理论价值得以确立,并持续激发着关于实在性与理性界限的思考。
Abstract: Kant’s theory of things-in-themselves is a core concept in his philosophical system. Although things-in-themselves exist, they are unknowable due to the limitations of human cognition, which is confined to empirical intuition. This theory has sparked widespread academic debate, providing reasons within German Idealism, Neo-Kantianism, and Kant studies for either accepting or overcoming the concept of things-in-themselves. Although there is still no consensus on its ontological status and epistemic function, it is through the continuous questioning and interpretation of this concept that its core theoretical value as a boundary for human rational self-critique has been established, persistently inspiring thoughts about the limits of reality and reason.
文章引用:盛墨林. 理性的界限:康德的物自身理论及其影响[J]. 哲学进展, 2026, 15(5): 128-133. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2026.155211

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