熟悉性何以构成生活世界的超越论基础

How Familiarity Constitutes the Transcendental Foundation of the Life-World

摘要: 生活世界是胡塞尔晚期现象学的一个核心概念，但学界对其理解存在分歧，其中卢曼批评胡塞尔未能充分处理熟悉性问题。本文通过对胡塞尔《欧洲科学的危机与超越论的现象学》及相关内容的分析反驳卢曼的批评，论证熟悉性恰恰是生活世界的超越论特征而非日常心理现象。生活世界的熟悉性具有三个维度：作为“不变的风格”的预先被给予性、身体经验的熟悉性框架、以及经验的类型化结构。这三个维度表明，熟悉性是生活世界经验得以可能的超越论条件，而非社会系统运作的产物。

Abstract: The life-world is a central concept in Husserl’s later phenomenology, yet its interpretation remains controversial. Niklas Luhmann criticizes Husserl for failing to adequately address the problem of familiarity, arguing that the distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar is the most primordial and founding structure of the life-world. This paper challenges Luhmann’s critique by analyzing Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and related texts. It demonstrates that familiarity is not a mundane psychological feature of everyday experience but a transcendental characteristic of the life-world. The familiarity of the life-world manifests in three interconnected dimensions: (1) pre-givenness as an “invariant style,” which constitutes the original intelligibility of the world; (2) the familiar framework of bodily experience, where the lived body functions as the zero-point of orientation and the medium of intercorporeal understanding; and (3) the typological structure of experience, through which passive synthesis pre-categorizes perceptual materials and enables the anticipation of the unfamiliar. These three dimensions collectively show that familiarity is the transcendental condition for the possibility of life-world experience, rather than an empirical phenomenon to be explained by social system operations. The paper concludes that Luhmann’s critique rests on a methodological misunderstanding, as he interprets the life-world within the natural attitude, thereby overlooking its transcendental dimension. A proper phenomenological understanding of familiarity reveals the life-world as the subjective source of all objective knowledge, preserving the critical and foundational potential of Husserl’s late philosophy.