生成式人工智能时代认识主体观的三重类型及其互补制衡

The Threefold Typology of the Epistemic Subject in the Era of Generative AI: Complementarity and Checks and Balances

摘要: 生成式人工智能的迅速发展，使主体问题重新成为认识论、科学技术哲学与技术治理研究中的焦点。与传统人工智能主要承担识别、检索和自动化处理功能不同，生成式人工智能已经深度介入文本生产、知识组织、问题生成、论证展开和意义建构等环节，从而使谁在认识如何认识何为认识等经典哲学问题在新的技术背景下被重新激活。围绕这一现实变化，现有研究逐渐形成三种具有代表性的认识主体观：意向性认识主体观、交互性认识主体观与分布性认识主体观。意向性认识主体观强调主体是否具有关于世界的意向性结构，并试图以理解或语义指向作为主体资格的核心判准；交互性认识主体观将主体理解为在具体协同实践中形成的角色结构，强调人机互动中的认识代理、责任分工与规范安排；分布性认识主体观则把主体问题推进到平台、制度与网络结构层面，突出生成式人工智能嵌入分布式认知网络后所形成的系统性主体效应。三种主体观分别把握了生成式人工智能时代认识活动的不同维度，但任何单一立场都难以完整说明现实中的主体重构。基于此，本文主张以互补制衡的方式理解生成式人工智能时代的认识主体问题：既拒绝把人工智能神秘化为具有独立意志的新主体，也反对把它简单还原为完全中性的工具，而是在坚持人的主体地位与责任地位的前提下，承认算法系统、平台结构与制度安排对认知活动的深度塑造作用。这样的综合视角，有助于突破人工智能是不是主体的抽象二元争论，更准确地把握当代知识生产方式变化中的主体位置、责任边界与规范含义。

Abstract: The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has brought the question of the “subject” back into the spotlight within the fields of epistemology, the philosophy of science and technology, and technology governance studies. Unlike traditional AI—which primarily performs functions related to recognition, retrieval, and automated processing—generative AI has become deeply involved in processes such as text generation, knowledge organization, problem formulation, argumentation, and meaning construction. Consequently, classic philosophical inquiries—such as “who knows?”, “how is knowing achieved?”, and “what constitutes knowing?”—have been reanimated within this new technological landscape. In response to this shifting reality, existing scholarship has gradually coalesced around three representative conceptions of the epistemic subject: the intentional subject, the interactive subject, and the distributed subject. The intentional view emphasizes whether a subject possesses an intentional structure regarding the world, attempting to establish “understanding” or “semantic directedness” as the core criterion for subject status. The interactive view conceptualizes the subject as a role structure forged within specific collaborative practices, highlighting the dynamics of epistemic agency, the division of responsibility, and normative arrangements within human-machine interactions. The distributed view, conversely, elevates the question of the subject to the level of platforms, institutions, and network structures, underscoring the systemic subject-effects that emerge when generative AI is embedded within distributed cognitive networks. While each of these three perspectives captures a distinct dimension of epistemic activity in the era of generative AI, no single standpoint suffices to fully account for the actual reconstruction of the subject occurring in reality. Accordingly, this paper advocates for an approach to the epistemic subject in the generative AI era characterized by “complementary checks and balances”: it rejects both the mystification of AI as a novel subject endowed with independent will, and its simplistic reduction to a completely neutral tool; instead—while firmly upholding the primacy of human agency and responsibility—it acknowledges the profound influence that algorithmic systems, platform architectures, and institutional frameworks exert upon cognitive activities. Such a synthetic perspective helps transcend the abstract, binary debate over whether AI constitutes a “subject,” thereby enabling a more precise grasp of the subject’s positioning, the boundaries of responsibility, and the normative implications inherent in the evolving modes of contemporary knowledge production.