浅析明见性对笛卡尔“清楚分明”原则的转化

A Brief Analysis of the Transformation of Descartes’ “Clear and Distinct” Principle by Evidence

摘要: 笛卡尔的“清楚分明”原则面临“笛卡尔循环”的困境：真理的最终依据不得不诉诸外在的上帝。胡塞尔通过明见性转化了这一原则，一方面，通过现象学悬搁，将真理的担保从外在上帝收归内在意识；另一方面，通过意向性分析，将真理的对象从观念转向事物本身的自身显现。然而，这一转化也付出了代价，先验自我陷入了唯我论困境，明见性对“在场”的依赖也限制了其适用范围。明见性与清楚分明的差异，与其说是一种解决，不如说是一次问题域的转换。

Abstract: Descartes’ “clear and distinct” principle faces the dilemma of the “Cartesian circle”: the ultimate foundation of truth has to appeal to an external God. Husserl transformed this principle through the concept of evidence. On the one hand, through phenomenological epochē, he shifted the guarantee of truth from an external God to internal consciousness itself; on the other hand, through the analysis of intentionality, he transformed the object of truth from ideas to the self-manifestation of things themselves, where matters and states of affairs are present in consciousness as themselves. However, this transformation also comes at a cost: the transcendental self falls into the predicament of solipsism, and evidence’s reliance on “presence” limits its scope of application. The difference between evidence and the clear and distinct is not so much a solution as a shift of the problem domain.