黑格尔“实体即主体”原则对哲学本原问题的辩证解答

Hegel’s Principle of “Substance is Subject” as a Dialectical Solution to the Problem of the Philosophical Origin

摘要: 黑格尔通过“实体即主体”原则，以辩证方法将本原界定为“绝对精神”的自我实现过程。批判性扬弃了康德物自体导致的二元论、费希特绝对自我的主观倾向及谢林绝对同一的静态性，主张本原是通过自我否定、外化并复归自身而达成主客统一的能动整体。黑格尔的本原在《精神现象学》的意识经验史与《逻辑学》的范畴推演中得到系统性呈现，其真理性体现为全体性的辩证运动。这既标志着古典形而上学的完成，其内在的体系性与方法论张力也为后世哲学提供了批判与超越的理论资源。

Abstract: Through the principle of “substance is subject,” Hegel dialectically defines the origin as the self-realizing process of “absolute spirit.” Critically sublating the dualism entailed by Kant’s thing-in-itself, the subjective tendency of Fichte’s absolute ego, and the static character of Schelling’s absolute identity, Hegel maintains that the origin is a dynamic whole that achieves the unity of subject and object through self-negation, externalization, and return to itself. Hegel’s conception of the origin is systematically presented in the history of the experience of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit and in the categorial derivation of the Science of Logic; its truth manifests itself as a holistic dialectical movement. This marks the completion of classical metaphysics, while its inherent tension between systematicity and methodology also provides later philosophy with theoretical resources for critique and transcendence.