对波菲利问题的再回答：一种基于“共构实在论”的跨文化考察

A Rejoinder to the Porphyrian Problem: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry Based on “Co-Constructive Realism”

摘要: 本文从中世纪波菲利问题出发，在梳理唯实论与唯名论传统争论的基础上，提出一种修正的唯实论立场——“共构实在论”。该立场主张共相并非独立于殊相的实体，而是内在于世界网络与认知结构中的“可普遍化之理”；同时强调共相与殊相是同一实在进程不可分割的两个维度，二者在本体论上平等，在认识论上共生。本文通过系统回应奥卡姆唯名论的局限，并引入庄子“齐物论”作为跨文化参照，力图在传统二元框架之外探索，为共相问题提供一种更具解释力的哲学路径。

Abstract: This paper begins with the medieval Porphyrian Problem and, based on a review of the traditions of realism and nominalism, proposes a revised realist position termed “co-constructive realism”. This position maintains that universals are not substances independent of particulars, but rather “universalizable principles” embedded within the network of the world and the cognitive structure. It simultaneously emphasizes that universals and particulars are two inseparable dimensions of the same process of reality, being ontologically equal and epistemologically symbiotic. By systematically addressing the limitations of Ockham’s nominalism and introducing Zhuangzi’s “Discourse on the Equality of Things” as a cross-cultural reference, this paper seeks to transcend traditional dichotomies and offer a more explanatorily powerful modern philosophical solution to the problem of universals.