从“自由”的角度析郭象独化论
Analyzing Guo Xiang’s Theory of Independence from the Perspective of “Freedom”
摘要: 郭象的“独化论”以个体生命的现实存在为基础,驳斥魏晋以来正始玄学提倡的“贵无论”以及裴頠所提倡的“崇有论”,言“造物无主”,阐明万物以“无本”为本,以“自然”为真,从而开辟出一个没有有限性束缚的自由领地,使“自由”在这片空地上得以可能。这种“自由领地”使个体不被任何具象性因素所裹挟和预设,个体以实然的状态自性存在,其“生”乃欸然自生,不依外物,其“性”乃天生具备,尽性即得,个体以这种“自生”“自性”的自然存在方式不断开启未知的生命旅程,这种存在方式是“自由”的存在论支撑,亦可以说是“自由”的现实进路,如此,个体之“自由”得以涌现,并且在纷繁复杂的生命境域中,个体与其他万事万物相因俱济,独化于玄冥之境,这也是郭象“自由观”的理想境界。
Abstract: Guo Xiang’s theory of “individualization” is based on the reality of individual life, refuting the “valuing everything” advocated by the orthodox metaphysics since the Wei and Jin dynasties and the “revering existence theory” advocated by Pei Di. It states that “creation has no owner” and clarifies that all things are based on “nothingness” and “nature” as truth, thus opening up a free territory without limited constraints and making “freedom” possible on this empty land. This kind of “free territory” allows individuals to be free from any concrete factors and preconceptions. Individuals have their own subjectivity, and their “life” is naturally generated without relying on external things. Their “nature” is innate and obtained by nature. Individuals constantly embark on unknown life journeys in this natural way of “self-generation” and “self-nature”. This way of existence is the ontological support of “freedom” and can also be said to be the realistic path of “freedom”. In this way, the “freedom” of individuals can emerge, and in the complex and varied life realm, individuals are in harmony with all other things and become unique in the mysterious realm. This is also the highest level of Guo Xiang’s “freedom view”.
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