作为现身的此在之具身——从在世空间性与身体空间性之比较中重思海德格尔的身体问题

Embodied Being of Dasein as Befindlichkeit—Rethinking Heidegger’s Problem of the Body through a Comparison of the Spatiality of Being-in-the-World and Bodily Spatiality

摘要: 海德格尔在《存在与时间》中通过此在在世的生存活动来展开空间，对身体的阐释极少，与此相反，梅洛–庞蒂虽吸收了“在世”，但将空间奠基于“身体”，强调身体的源始地位。文章从这一理论张力出发将两者对空间的不同展开方式进行比较，并在此基础上证明海德格尔并非否定身体的作用，只是更强调在世的在先性。不仅如此，此在并非无身的主体，海德格尔并非忽略身体问题，而是用现身情态给出了另一理解路径：具身的情绪使此在能够是其自身，世界和空间都奠基于此现身之中，此在是整体地、具身地存在着的。

Abstract: In Being and Time, Heidegger unfolds space through the existential activities of Dasein in the world, with minimal elaboration on the body. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty, although absorbing the concept of “Being-in-the-world”, bases space on the “body” and emphasizes the primordial status of the body. This article compares the different ways in which the two unfold space from this theoretical tension, and on this basis, proves that Heidegger does not negate the role of the body, but rather emphasizes the priority of Being-in-the-world. Moreover, Dasein is not a disembodied subject, and Heidegger does not ignore the issue of the body. Instead, through the concept of state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), he offers an alternative path of understanding: embodied state-of-mind enables Dasein to be itself. World and space are both grounded in this state-of-mind. Dasein exists as a whole and in an embodied manner.