性善与性恶之辩：孟子与荀子人性论的认识论基础及其当代意义

The Debate on the Goodness and Badness of Human Nature: The Epistemological Basis of Mencius’ and Xunzi’s Theories of Human Nature and Their Contemporary Significance

摘要: 本文旨在从认识论的视角重新审视并比较孟子“性善论”与荀子“性恶论”的核心分歧。文章认为，二者之争不仅是伦理学上“善”与“恶”的对立，更深层的是两种根本不同的认知路径之争。孟子以先验的内在心性为基础，构建了“由内而外”的道德先验论，认为道德是人固有“四端”的扩充与显现。荀子则基于经验观察，主张“化性起伪”，将道德视为后天学习与社会规范建构的产物，体现了“由外而内”的经验主义认识论。文章进一步指出，这两种看似对立的理论，在道德生成机制与社会秩序建构层面形成了“内在道德生成–外在制度设计”的双重互补结构。作者认为，这一思想张力不仅是中国传统伦理思想的重要资源，也对当代伦理教育与社会秩序建构具有启示意义。

Abstract: This article aims to re-examine and compare the core differences between Mencius’ ‘innate goodness’ theory and Xunzi’s ‘innate evil’ theory from an epistemological perspective. The article argues that their dispute is not only an opposition between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in ethics, but more fundamentally a contest between two fundamentally different cognitive approaches. Mencius, based on the a priori inherent human nature, constructed a ‘from the inside out’ moral a priori theory, holding that morality is an expansion and manifestation of the inherent ‘four beginnings’ in humans. Xunzi, on the other hand, based on empirical observation, advocated that ‘nature is transformed through deliberate cultivation,’ viewing morality as the product of acquired learning and social norm construction, embodying an ‘from the outside in’ empirical epistemology. The article further points out that these seemingly opposing theories form a dual complementary structure of ‘internal moral generation—external institutional design’ at the levels of moral formation mechanisms and social order construction. The author believes that this ideological tension is not only an important resource of traditional Chinese ethical thought, but also provides insights for contemporary ethical education and the construction of social order.