福利经济学对中国个人养老金政策的影响——基于帕累托最优的分析性框架

The Impact of Welfare Economics on China’s Personal Pension Policy—An Analytical Framework Based on Pareto Optimality

摘要: 个人养老金作为中国多层次养老保险体系的重要组成部分，其税收政策的合理性直接影响政策覆盖广度、公平性与长期可持续性。本文以福利经济学中的帕累托最优理论为核心分析框架，结合年金理论、成本–收益理论与多支柱养老保险理论，系统梳理2018年以来中国个人养老金政策的演进历程，重点剖析当前税收政策在激励结构、公平性与财政可持续性方面的突出问题。研究发现：现行1.2万元/年的税收扣除上限导致激励覆盖面不足，中低收入群体参与意愿薄弱；领取环节3%的统一税率引发公平性争议；缴费与投资环节的税收减免亦对当期财政造成压力。基于此，本文提出“分层补贴 + 动态税优”的激励重构方案、跨周期财政平衡机制及政策协同创新路径，旨在通过帕累托改进实现个人养老金福利效用最大化，为完善中国社会保障政策提供理论参考与实践建议。

Abstract: As an important component of China’s multi-tiered pension insurance system, the rationality of the tax policy for personal pensions directly affects the policy’s coverage, fairness, and long-term sustainability. This paper takes Pareto optimality, a core concept in welfare economics, as the main analytical framework, and integrates annuity theory, cost-benefit theory, and the multi-pillar pension theory to systematically review the evolution of China’s personal pension policy since 2018, with a focus on analyzing the prominent problems of the current tax policy in terms of incentive structure, fairness, and fiscal sustainability. The study finds that the current annual tax deduction ceiling of 12,000 yuan leads to insufficient incentive coverage and weak willingness to participate among low- and middle-income groups; the uniform 3% tax rate at the withdrawal stage raises fairness concerns; and the tax exemptions at the contribution and investment stages also exert pressure on current fiscal revenue. Based on these findings, this paper proposes an incentive restructuring scheme of “tiered subsidies + dynamic tax incentives”, a cross-cyclical fiscal balance mechanism, and a policy coordination innovation path, aiming to maximize the welfare utility of personal pensions through Pareto improvements, and to provide theoretical references and practical suggestions for improving China’s social security policy.