碳关税壁垒下跨境电商供应链协同减排微分博弈研究
Research on Differential Game of Collaborative Emission Reduction in Cross-Border E-Commerce Supply Chain under Carbon Tariff Barrier
摘要: 在全球碳中和战略推进与欧盟碳边境调节机制(CBAM)正式实施的背景下,碳关税已然成为制约跨境电商贸易发展的关键因素。针对当前跨境电商供应链存在的主体协同性不足、减排投入意愿偏低等现实问题,文章引入管理工程的系统优化与协同治理理论,将绿色合规资产设定为动态变量,构建由国内制造商与海外零售商构成的跨境电商供应链微分博弈模型,设计“双向成本分担”协同契约,并通过算例仿真验证契约有效性。研究结果表明,分散决策模式下易出现主体“搭便车”、减排投入不足等问题,所设计契约能够实现供应链整体效益的帕累托改进;碳关税强度对供应链减排行为呈现“倒U型”影响特征,消费者绿色偏好与减排转化系数可有效推动绿色合规资产积累。研究可为跨境电商供应链实现协同减排提供理论依据与实践参考。
Abstract: Against the backdrop of advancing global carbon neutrality strategies and the official implementation of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), carbon tariffs have emerged as a critical factor constraining the development of cross-border e-commerce trade. To address the current practical issues of insufficient collaboration among entities and low willingness to invest in emission reduction within cross-border e-commerce supply chains, this paper introduces the system optimization and collaborative governance theories of management engineering. By setting green compliance assets as a dynamic variable, this study constructs a differential game model for a cross-border e-commerce supply chain comprising domestic manufacturers and overseas retailers, designs a “two-way cost-sharing” collaborative contract, and verifies its effectiveness through numerical simulation. The research results indicate that the decentralized decision-making mode is prone to issues such as “free-riding” and insufficient investment in emission reduction, whereas the designed contract can achieve a Pareto improvement in the overall performance of the supply chain. Furthermore, the intensity of the carbon tariff exerts an “inverted U-shaped” impact on the supply chain’s emission reduction behavior, while consumer green preferences and the emission reduction conversion coefficient can effectively drive the accumulation of green compliance assets. This research provides theoretical foundations and practical references for cross-border e-commerce supply chains to achieve collaborative emission reduction.
文章引用:李轩. 碳关税壁垒下跨境电商供应链协同减排微分博弈研究[J]. 管理科学与工程, 2026, 15(3): 699-712. https://doi.org/10.12677/mse.2026.153068

参考文献

[1] 余壮雄, 薛钊杰, 胡毅. 欧美碳关税对中国产业发展的影响与福利分析[J]. 管理科学学报, 2025, 28(6): 17-32.
[2] Corvino, F. (2025) The Compound Injustice of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Ethics, Policy & Environment, 28, 26-45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[3] 董玮, 石晶晶. 欧盟碳关税对中国的经贸冲击及应对策略[J]. 生态经济, 2025, 41(1): 89-98.
[4] 陀才进, 孙慧, 张若威. 碳关税对中国全球价值链分工的影响研究[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2026(1): 133-147.
[5] 孟猛, 郑昭阳. 自主减排、碳关税对中国贸易和福利的影响研究[J]. 西安交通大学学报(社会科学版), 2024, 44(6): 62-77.
[6] 张令荣, 彭博, 程春琪. 基于区块链技术的低碳供应链政府补贴策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(10): 49-60.
[7] 孙嘉轶, 路阳阳, 滕春贤. 区块链技术对低碳供应链合作策略的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(10): 293-303.
[8] 倪骁然, 蔡树勋, 李润, 等. 低碳供应链视角下的留抵退税政策效应研究[J]. 财政研究, 2026, 47(3): 559-588.
[9] 黄晨星, 朱小武, 熊波, 等. 零售商主导的低碳供应链竞争结构与决策分析[J]. 工业技术经济, 2025, 44(7): 36-45.
[10] 王道平, 董汉玺, 张可. 区块链技术驱动下考虑减排积极性的动态低碳供应链微分博弈[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2024, 44(5): 1412-1431.
[11] 卓四清, 韩雪. 碳补贴和时滞效应下低碳供应链微分博弈研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(8): 7-14.
[12] 张永明, 楼高翔. 竞争型低碳供应链下考虑参考效应的微分博弈[J]. 系统工程, 2018, 36(6): 101-108.
[13] Zhang, Z. and Yu, L. (2022) Altruistic Mode Selection and Coordination in a Low-Carbon Closed-Loop Supply Chain under the Government’s Compound Subsidy: A Differential Game Analysis. Journal of Cleaner Production, 366, Article ID: 132863. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[14] Yang, X., Jiang, H., Sun, J., Tang, Y., Su, P. and Hong, S. (2026) Joint Dynamic Coordination Strategies for Low-Carbon Technologies in Coal Supply Chains Considering Time-Delay Effects: A Two-Stage Differential Game Approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 320, Article ID: 132131. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[15] Kang, Y., Dong, P., Ju, Y. and Zhang, T. (2024) Differential Game Theoretic Analysis of the Blockchain Technology Investment and Carbon Reduction Strategy in Digital Supply Chain with Government Intervention. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 189, Article ID: 109953. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[16] Nerlove, M. and Arrow, K.J. (1962) Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic Conditions. Economica, 29, 129-142. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[17] 蔡建湖, 谭辉龙, 朱克毓, 等. 考虑风险规避的低碳供应链需求信息共享模型[J/OL]. 系统工程理论与实践: 1-20.
https://link.cnki.net/urlid/11.2267.N.20251118.1323.002, 2026-04-25.
[18] 张云丰, 孙利君, 刘伟华, 等. 低碳补贴下产出不确定性制造商的融资与减排决策及协调研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2025, 45(9): 3010-3024.
[19] 张令荣, 王锋, 刘笑言. 碳交易与区块链技术下双产品低碳供应链减排决策研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2025, 39(4): 239-250.
[20] 夏良杰, 冯锦茹, 杨新文, 等. 考虑过度自信和信息不对称的低碳供应链减排与促销博弈[J]. 运筹与管理, 2025, 34(9): 169-176.
[21] 姜跃, 陈锦聪. 不同契约下嵌入区块链的低碳技术共享微分博弈策略[J/OL]. 山东大学学报(理学版): 1-17.
https://link.cnki.net/urlid/37.1389.N.20260429.0932.002, 2026-04-25.
[22] 郭金森, 于春艳, 周永务. 资金约束下考虑制造商公平关切的低碳供应链联合减排决策[J/OL]. 昆明理工大学学报(自然科学版): 1-15. 2026-04-25. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef
[23] 李小燕, 杨丽芳, 陈双双. 考虑政府双重补贴和企业互惠偏好行为的双渠道供应链减排策略研究[J]. 数学的实践与认识, 2025, 55(7): 11-31.