电商“大数据杀熟”行为的反垄断法规制问题探析
Analysis of the Anti-Monopoly Legal System of E-Commerce’s “Big Data Killing” Behavior
摘要: 本研究聚焦于电子商务平台“大数据杀熟”行为的反垄断法规制问题。这种行为是指平台运用算法与大数据分析的方法,对老用户或特定群体实施定价歧视的现象,这种行为不仅直接侵害消费者公平交易权,而且更深层次地扭曲了市场竞争秩序,从而巩固平台的市场支配地位。本研究系统剖析了当前规制面临的三大核心困境:在实体法层面,传统反垄断分析框架在行为定性、市场力量认定及构成要件证明上难以适应数字平台经济的复杂性;在程序与证据层面,算法黑箱与信息不对称导致“发现难、取证难、审查难”的现实障碍;在协同理念层面,多头监管的分散与效率抗辩同个体公平的价值冲突削弱了规制合力。针对此,本文提出应从完善实体规则、优化程序机制、构建协同监管体系及确立以“保护竞争过程”为核心的规制理念等方面进行系统性革新,并借鉴欧盟事前干预与美国事后救济的比较法经验,探索形成符合我国数字市场竞争特点的综合性规制方案,为构建公平、有序的平台经济竞争环境提供理论参考与实践指引。
Abstract: This study focuses on the anti-monopoly legal system of the “big data killing” behavior of e-commerce platforms. This behavior refers to the phenomenon that the platform uses algorithms and big data analysis to discriminate against old users or specific groups. This behavior not only directly infringes on consumers’ right to fair trading, but also deeply distorts the order of market competition, thus consolidating the platform’s market dominance. This study systematically analyzes the three core dilemmas facing the current regulation: at the level of substantive law, the traditional antitrust analysis framework is difficult to adapt to the complexity of the digital platform economy in terms of behavioral characterization, market force identification and constituent element proof; at the procedural and evidence level, the algorithm black box and information asymmetry lead to “difficult to find, take the real obstacle of “difficult to prove and examine”; at the level of the concept of coordination, the dispersion of multiple supervision and the defense of efficiency and the value conflict of individual fairness have weakened the synergy of regulation. In response to this, this article proposes that systematic innovation should be carried out in terms of improving entity rules, optimizing procedural mechanisms, building a coordinated supervision system and establishing a regulatory concept with “protecting the competition process” as the core, and drawing on the comparative experience of the EU’s prior intervention and the post-remedial relief of the United States, to explore the formation of competition in China’s digital market. The characteristic comprehensive regulatory scheme provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for building a fair and orderly platform economic competition environment.
文章引用:方海燕. 电商“大数据杀熟”行为的反垄断法规制问题探析[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(6): 130-138. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.156616

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