历史唯物主义视域下机器道德的本质研究
Research on the Essence of Machine Morality from the Perspective of Historical Materialism
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2026.156265, PDF,   
作者: 姬文静, 崔玮琳:北京建筑大学马克思主义学院,北京
关键词: 历史唯物主义机器道德情感本质Historical Materialism Machine Morality Emotion Essence
摘要: 在历史唯物主义视域下,机器道德的本质并非真正意义上的道德能力。从生产力与生产关系的辩证关系来看,机器道德是人类基于自身生产生活需求,通过技术手段赋予机器的特定功能集合,是人类道德认知和实践在技术层面的映射。其局限显著,一方面,机器缺乏主观意识和情感体验,无法真正理解道德情境中的复杂情感因素,只能依据预设程序和算法运行。另一方面,机器道德受技术发展水平和社会生产关系的制约,不同社会阶层和利益群体对机器道德定义和应用存在差异。同时,机器难以适应社会历史发展中不断变化的道德观念和价值标准,无法进行自主的道德判断和选择。因此,对机器道德需理性看待,重视人类在道德领域的主体地位。
Abstract: From the perspective of historical materialism, the essence of machine morality is not moral ability in the true sense. From the perspective of the dialectical relationship between productive forces and production relations, machine morality is a set of specific functions given to machines by human beings based on their own production and life needs, and is the mapping of human moral cognition and practice at the technical level. On the one hand, machines lack subjective consciousness and emotional experience, cannot truly understand complex emotional factors in moral situations, and can only operate according to preset programs and algorithms. On the other hand, machine morality is restricted by the level of technological development and social production relations, and there are differences in the definition and application of machine morality by different social classes and interest groups. At the same time, it is difficult for machines to adapt to the changing moral concepts and value standards in the development of social history, and cannot make independent moral judgments and choices. Therefore, machine morality needs to be viewed rationally and the main position of human beings in the field of morality should be valued.
文章引用:姬文静, 崔玮琳. 历史唯物主义视域下机器道德的本质研究[J]. 哲学进展, 2026, 15(6): 34-39. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2026.156265

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