关系嵌入对股东代理成本的影响

The Impact of Relational Embeddedness on Shareholder Agency Costs

摘要: 文章以2007~2012年度A股民营上市公司为样本，探讨实际控制人与总经理之间的关系是否会影响股东的代理成本，统计了民营上市公司实际控制人与总经理的关系嵌入形式，并实证分析了关系嵌入强度对股东代理成本的影响。并统计发现实际控制人喜欢亲自掌握公司的控制权或者安排亲人、熟人来经营管理企业。熟人，亲人管理公司经营的话跟自己实际控制的差不多，也可以进行控制。实证结果表明随着实际控制人与总经理的关系嵌入强度递增，股东代理成本就会递增。实证研究还表明，民营上市企业公司治理机制没有发挥作用，导致不能制约关系治理机制下大股东对中小股东的掠夺。在关系治理盛行的文化环境下，加强法治信用和公民道德素质建设，强化制度的约束，才能彻底改变人治对法制的随意践踏，促进公司的发展，完善公司的治理。

Abstract: This article takes private listed companies in China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2012 as its research sample, and examines whether the relationship between the actual controller and the general manager affects shareholder agency costs. It first documents the specific forms of relational embeddedness between actual controllers and general managers in these private listed companies, then empirically analyzes how the strength of this relational embeddedness influences shareholder agency costs. The statistical findings reveal that actual controllers prefer to personally exercise control over their companies, or alternatively, appoint relatives or acquaintances to manage and operate the business. When relatives or acquaintances manage the company, the degree of control is essentially equivalent to direct personal control, thereby enabling the actual controller to maintain effective control. The empirical results demonstrate that as the strength of relational embeddedness between the actual controller and the general manager increases, shareholder agency costs rise correspondingly. Furthermore, the empirical study indicates that corporate governance mechanisms in private listed companies have failed to function effectively, rendering them incapable of restraining the expropriation of minority shareholders by large shareholders under the relationship-based governance mechanism. In a cultural environment where relationship governance prevails, only by strengthening the construction of the legal and credit systems, enhancing citizens’ moral quality, and reinforcing institutional constraints can we fundamentally change the arbitrary trampling of the rule of law by rule-of-man practices, promote corporate development, and improve corporate governance.