数字平台扼杀式并购的反垄断问题研究
Research on Antitrust Issues of Digital Platform Killer Acquisitions
摘要: 数字平台扼杀式并购是指互联网背景下大平台在初创企业成熟前将其收购以提前消除竞争。此类并购行为存在消除潜在竞争和市场创新动力的风险,对竞争秩序、企业创新动力和消费者福利造成的危害巨大。然而我国现行法律应对此行为存在三大困境:一是审查标准重营业额,识别不出平台靠数据建立的优势,导致很多并购没被审查;二是举证责任全由执法机构承担,在信息不对称下很难证明还没发生的损害;三是事后监管规定不够清晰,罚款太低缺乏威慑。对此,本文提出三项建议:将交易金额和数据规模纳入申报门槛,建立潜在竞争威胁认定机制;引入推定违法制度,让收购方承担举证责任并强化信息披露;明确事后审查启动条件,大幅提高违法成本,建立常态化市场监测,从而有效规制平台的反竞争并购。
Abstract: Platform killer acquisitions refer to the practice wherein large digital platforms acquire nascent startups before they mature, thereby preemptively eliminating potential competition. Such mergers and acquisitions pose a risk of eliminating potential competition and dampening market incentives for innovation, causing significant harm to competitive order, corporate innovation drive, and consumer welfare. However, under current Chinese law, there are three major dilemmas in addressing such conduct: First, existing merger review standards overly rely on turnover thresholds, failing to capture the competitive advantages platforms derive from data, which allows numerous acquisitions to bypass regulatory scrutiny. Second, the burden of proof rests entirely on enforcement agencies; under severe information asymmetry, it is highly challenging to prove competitive harms that have not yet materialized. Third, ex-post regulatory provisions remain vague, and the currently low fines fail to provide sufficient deterrence. To address these issues, this paper proposes three optimization paths: First, integrating transaction value and data scale into the mandatory notification thresholds to establish a mechanism for identifying potential competitive threats. Second, introducing a presumption of illegality framework to appropriately shift the burden of proof to the acquirers and enhance information disclosure requirements. Third, clarifying the triggering conditions for ex-post reviews, significantly increasing the cost of legal violations, and establishing a regular market monitoring system, thereby effectively regulating anti-competitive acquisitions by digital platforms.
文章引用:丁伟东. 数字平台扼杀式并购的反垄断问题研究[J]. 社会科学前沿, 2026, 15(6): 109-115. https://doi.org/10.12677/ass.2026.156456

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