马克思哲学中的“现实人”与西方传统“抽象人”的哲学辨析
A Philosophical Analysis of “Real Individual” in Marxist Philosophy and “Abstract Man” in Western Traditional Philosophy
摘要: 对人的哲学追问是贯穿西方思想史的核心命题。西方哲学传统在追寻人的本质时,形成了两条典型的抽象化路径:以德国观念论为代表的理性主义路径将人归结为“自我意识”的承载者,以英美经验论为代表的经验主义路径将人还原为追求自利的“经济人”或前社会的“自然人”。两者遵循着共同的方法论——形而上学本质主义,即从具有丰富规定性的具体的人出发,经由“由具体到抽象”的认识路径,将人的某一侧面孤立地上升为整体本质。马克思完成了对这一方法论根基的根本性逆转:通过对黑格尔“思辨人学”和费尔巴哈“感性人学”的双重批判,马克思揭示了两条认识道路的本质分野,指出从具体到抽象仅是认识的必经阶段,科学的认识必须完成从抽象到具体的“回转”,在思维中再现作为“许多规定的综合”的“具体总体”。“现实人”正是这一方法论革命的结晶——它超越了西方传统将人抽象为单一本质的阈限,从生命存在、生产实践、生活方式、社会关系、思想观念五个递进维度确立了人的社会历史规定性,实现了人学观和历史观的双重革命。
Abstract: The philosophical inquiry into human beings is a core proposition running through the history of Western ideological thought. In the pursuit of human essence, the tradition of Western philosophy has formed two typical paths of abstraction. The rationalist path, represented by German idealism, reduces human beings to the bearer of “self-consciousness”; while the empiricist path, represented by British and American empiricism, simplifies humans into the self-interested “economic man” or the pre-social “natural man”. Both follow a shared methodology of metaphysical essentialism. That is, starting from concrete human beings with rich determinations, they elevate a single aspect of human existence in isolation into the overall essence via the cognitive route “from the concrete to the abstract”. Marx fundamentally reversed the foundation of this methodology. Through a dual critique of Hegel’s “speculative anthropology” and Feuerbach’s “sensuous anthropology”, he revealed the essential division between the two cognitive approaches. Marx pointed out that the movement from the concrete to the abstract is merely an inevitable stage of cognition, and scientific cognition must complete the “return” from the abstract back to the concrete, reproducing in thought the “concrete totality” as a “synthesis of many determinations”. The “real individual” stands precisely as the fruit of this methodological revolution. Transcending the limit of Western tradition that abstracts human beings into a single fixed essence, it establishes the socio-historical determinations of human beings through five progressive dimensions: biological existence, productive practice, mode of life, social relations, and ideological concepts, thereby accomplishing a dual revolution in the conception of humanity and the conception of history.
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