我国职工董事权利行使保障问题研究

Research on the Protection of the Rights of Employee Directors in China

摘要: 职工董事制度是劳动者参与公司治理的核心制度载体，也是平衡劳资利益、完善中国特色现代企业制度的重要机制。然而，现行公司法对职工董事制度的规定较为原则，在特别职权界定、信义义务履行标准及法律责任分配等层面存在制度空白。文章以人力资本所有权理论与公司社会责任理论为分析框架，结合联科科技、长园集团、金科股份三个典型案例，揭示了职工董事制度面临的三重结构性困境：履职保障规范缺失导致职工董事独立性受损，制度易被异化为资本博弈工具；职工董事普遍专业素养不足，难以在公司重大决策中发挥实质作用；现行法律对职工董事信义义务的双重性缺乏明确指引，利益冲突下责任认定标准模糊。针对上述困境，文章提出法律保障、能力建设、激励约束三位一体的制度完善路径，推动职工董事从形式化参与向实质性治理转型。

Abstract: The employee director system is a core institutional vehicle for employee participation in corporate governance and an important mechanism for balancing labor and capital interests and improving the modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. However, the current Company Law’s provisions on the employee director system are relatively general, with institutional gaps in areas such as the definition of special powers, standards for fulfilling fiduciary duties, and the allocation of legal responsibilities. This paper uses the theories of human capital ownership and corporate social responsibility as an analytical framework, and combines three typical cases—Linke Technology, Changyuan Group, and Jinke Properties—to reveal the three structural dilemmas facing the employee director system: The lack of normative guarantees for fulfilling duties leads to the impairment of employee directors’ independence, making the system easily distorted into a tool for capital games; Employee directors generally lack professional competence, making it difficult for them to play a substantial role in major corporate decisions; Current laws lack clear guidance on the dual nature of employee directors’ fiduciary duties, and the standards for determining responsibility in cases of conflict of interest are vague. To address these dilemmas, this paper proposes a three-pronged approach to improve the system, integrating legal guarantees, capacity building, and incentive constraints, to promote the transformation of employee directors from formal participation to substantive governance.