“先用后付”的电商经济属性与平台治理研究
An Analysis of the Legal Nature and Regulatory Application of “Buy Now, Pay Later”
摘要: “先用后付”作为数字消费领域的新型支付模式,在提升交易便利性的同时引发了多重治理争议。本文以该模式的电商经济属性界定与平台治理规范适用为核心议题,结合行为经济学“默认选项偏误”与法律经济学理论,剖析平台技术架构对消费者决策的影响机理,通过类型化分析揭示其兼具电商交易与消费信贷的双重属性,并从合同相对性及功能监管理论视角,对“类型化认定”标准进行法理阐释,主张应依据运营主体差异分别适用电商平台治理规则与消费金融监管规范。在消费者权益保护层面,系统梳理知情权、自主选择权及解除权等核心权利在“先用后付”场景下的实现困境;同时突破“平台–消费者”二元分析框架,引入商家主体,剖析该模式对商家权利义务的影响。研究发现,平台默认开通与开通容易取消难构成对消费者意思自治的隐性侵蚀;未付款状态下损失认定的争议暴露出传统电商售后理论的回应滞后;七日无理由退货权与合同撤销权的行使亦面临特殊挑战,而多方主体的利益博弈也使得治理方案的设计需兼顾多元诉求。针对上述问题,本文从强化平台信息披露机制、优化小额争议处理、推进平台协同治理、平衡多方利益等维度提出治理优化建议,以期在鼓励数字支付创新与筑牢用户权益保障屏障之间寻求平衡,同时实现多方主体的利益共赢,为“先用后付”模式的健康发展提供理论参考与治理方案。
Abstract: As a new payment model in the digital consumption sector, “buy now, pay later” has enhanced transactional convenience while sparking multiple governance controversies. This paper focuses on defining the e-commerce economic attributes of this model and determining the applicability of platform governance regulations. By integrating behavioral economics’ “default option bias” with legal economics theory, it analyzes how platform technical architectures influence consumer decision-making. Through typological analysis, it reveals the model’s dual nature as both an e-commerce transaction and a form of consumer credit. Furthermore, from the perspectives of contractual relativity and functional regulation theory, the paper provides a legal rationale for the “typological classification” criteria, arguing that e-commerce platform governance rules and consumer finance regulatory norms should be applied separately based on differences in the operating entities. Regarding consumer rights protection, the study systematically examines the challenges in realizing core rights—such as the right to information, the right to autonomous choice, and the right of rescission—within “use-now-pay-later” scenarios; simultaneously, it transcends the “platform-consumer” binary analytical framework by introducing merchant entities to analyze the model’s impact on merchants’ rights and obligations. The study finds that platforms’ default activation of services and the ease of activation coupled with the difficulty of cancellation constitute a subtle erosion of consumers’ autonomy of will; disputes over loss determination in unpaid statuses expose the lag in response from traditional e-commerce after-sales theories; the exercise of the seven-day no-reason return right and the right to rescind the contract also faces unique challenges, while the interplay of interests among multiple parties necessitates that governance solutions balance diverse demands. In response to these issues, this paper proposes governance optimization recommendations across several dimensions, including strengthening platform information disclosure mechanisms, optimizing the resolution of small-value disputes, promoting collaborative platform governance, and balancing the interests of multiple parties. The aim is to strike a balance between encouraging innovation in digital payments and fortifying safeguards for user rights, while achieving a win-win outcome for all stakeholders. This study provides theoretical insights and governance solutions to support the healthy development of the “buy now, pay later” model.
文章引用:孙铭一. “先用后付”的电商经济属性与平台治理研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(6): 665-673. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.156681

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