“自在之物”可以被消解吗？——从康德的批判哲学谈起

Can the “Thing-in-Itself” Be Dissolved?—Starting from Kant’s Critical Philosophy

摘要: 康德将其哲学命名为“批判哲学”，其中最关键的便在于自在之物的提出，这一概念贯穿于康德整个哲学体系。在康德哲学中，“自在之物”历来是争论较为集中的概念之一，如何认识和评价它，至今仍莫衷一是。厘清这一概念的含义，对于把握康德哲学的认识论、不可知论等一系列问题具有重要意义。在他之后的几位哲学家均试图寻求一种办法消解“物自体”，力图建立一种逻辑自洽、无界分的融贯哲学体系。本文在这样的哲学背景下，试图还原康德哲学体系中“物自体”的本意；进而从各个哲学家对自在之物的批判出发，阐明康德的“物自体”不能被轻易摒弃，指明这一概念在哲学史上有着举足轻重的意义。

Abstract: Kant termed his philosophy “critical philosophy”, and its most crucial aspect lies in the introduction of the concept of the thing-in-itself, which runs through his entire philosophical system. In Kant’s philosophy, the “thing-in-itself” has long been one of the most hotly debated concepts, and opinions on how to understand and evaluate it remain divided to this day. Clarifying the meaning of this concept is of great significance for grasping a range of issues in Kant’s philosophy, including epistemology and agnosticism. Several philosophers who followed him attempted to find a way to dissolve the “thing-in-itself”, striving to establish a logically coherent, undivided, and consistent philosophical system. Against this philosophical backdrop, this paper seeks to restore the original meaning of the “thing-in-itself” within Kant’s philosophical system; furthermore, by examining the critiques of the thing-in-itself offered by various philosophers, it demonstrates that Kant’s “thing-in-itself” cannot be easily dismissed, and highlights the pivotal significance of this concept in the history of philosophy.