|
[1]
|
Chisholm, R.M. (1982) Human Freedom and the Self. In: Watson, G., Ed., Free Will, Oxford University Press, 24-35.
|
|
[2]
|
Chisholm, R.M. (1976) Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court Publishing Company, 53.
|
|
[3]
|
蒂莫西·奥康纳. 个人与原因[M]. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2015.
|
|
[4]
|
Chisholm, R.M. (1969) Some Puzzles about Agency. In: Lambert, K., ed., The Logical Way of Doing Things, Yale University Press, 199-217.
|
|
[5]
|
Chisholm, R.M. (1976) The Agent as Cause. In: Brand, M. and Walton, D., Eds., Action Theory, Reidel, 199, 200.
|
|
[6]
|
O’Connor, T. (1995) Agent Causation. In: O’Connor, T., Ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press, 1.
|
|
[7]
|
O’Connor, T. (2000) Causality, Mind, and Free Will. Noûs, 34, 105-117. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
|
|
[8]
|
O’Connor, T. (2009) Agent-Causal Power. In: Handfield, T., Ed., Dispositions and Causes, Oxford University Press, 189-214. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
|
|
[9]
|
O’Connor, T. (2011) Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom. In: Kane, R., Ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 387.
|
|
[10]
|
Clarke, R. (2003) Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford University Press, 121.
|
|
[11]
|
Clarke, R. (2005) Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 86, 408-421. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
|