论霍布斯《利维坦》中“恐惧”的道德功能

On the Moral Function of “Fear” in Hobbes’ Leviathan

摘要: 在霍布斯的《利维坦》理论体系中，“恐惧”并非简单方面的心理情感，而是道德准则与政治秩序能够产生的逻辑基础与核心动力。在自然状态里，人因相互猜疑、防范，一直处于对暴力致死的深切恐惧当中，这种生存状况展现没有公共权威情况下人类生活的无序状态。但是，正是在这种广泛恐惧的驱动下，人们在理性的指引下逐步认识到和平对于自我生存的重要性，进一步发现自然法，并初步建立起以信约为核心的道德关联。为了让这种违背人类自然情感的信约确实具备约束力，个体基于契约出让自身权力，建立起具备权威的主权者，把原本分散的自然恐惧转变为对“利维坦”的制度性敬畏，从而促进正义与社会道德秩序的实际确立。霍布斯基于恐惧建立的伦理系统，在一定范围内脱离古典德性伦理的超验追求，为现代社会最低限度的公共伦理筑牢现实根基；但是其道德运行机制主要依靠外在强制和权威震慑，也让该伦理系统在道德自主性方面显示出明显的理论限制。

Abstract: In Thomas Hobbes’ theoretical system of Leviathan, “fear” is not merely a simple psychological emotion, but the logical foundation and core driving force for the emergence of moral norms and political order. In the state of nature, human beings are constantly in profound fear of violent death due to mutual suspicion and vigilance, and this existential condition reveals the disorder of human life in the absence of a public authority. Nevertheless, driven precisely by this pervasive fear, individuals gradually recognize the importance of peace for self-preservation under the guidance of reason, subsequently discover natural law, and initially establish a moral connection centered on covenants. To ensure that these covenants, which contradict the natural human passions, actually possess binding force, individuals alienate their natural rights based on a social contract, establish a sovereign with absolute authority, transform the original dispersed natural fear into institutional reverence for Leviathan, and thereby facilitate the actual establishment of justice and social moral order. The ethical system constructed by Hobbes on the basis of fear breaks away from the transcendent pursuit of classical virtue ethics to a certain extent, and lays a solid realistic foundation for the minimum public ethics of modern society. However, since its moral operation mechanism relies primarily on external coercion and authority deterrence, this ethical system exhibits obvious theoretical limitations in terms of moral autonomy.