数字平台自我优待行为的反垄断规制研究

Research on the Antitrust Regulation of Self-Preferencing by Digital Platforms

摘要: 在数字经济高速演进的宏观图景下，大型数字平台已跨越单纯的信息中介属性，演化为集市场架构搭建、交易规则制定与场内商业竞争于一体的复合型实体。这种“市场组织者”与“市场竞争者”双重角色的深度重叠，导致平台自治权极易异化，为其滥用底层架构优势实施“自我优待”行为提供了内生的制度性条件与技术便利。目前，国内外反垄断学界围绕该行为的定性存在显著分歧。我国新修《反垄断法》虽增设了针对数据和算法垄断的原则性条款，但在具体执法实践中，仍面临市场支配地位认定失灵、隐蔽性技术证据获取困难、非价格竞争损害量化模糊以及法律规范适用局限等系统性困境。为破解上述难题，本文主张摒弃传统单边市场框架，引入“跨市场竞争影响力”作为支配地位的补充认定标准。同时，建议构建针对“超级平台”与“普通平台”的分级分类双轨规制体系，引入常态化算法审计机制，并积极倡导行政外部规制与平台合规式内部治理相统一的路径，以期为我国数字经济领域的反垄断法治建设提供体系化指引。

Abstract: Under the macro-picture of the rapid evolution of the digital economy, large-scale digital platforms have transcended their mere attributes as information intermediaries, evolving into composite entities that integrate market architecture development, trading rule formulation, and in-platform commercial competition. This deep overlap of the dual roles of “market organizer” and “market competitor” easily leads to the alienation of platform autonomy, providing a natural breeding ground for the abuse of underlying architectural advantages to implement “self-preferencing” behaviors. Currently, there are significant deviations within the domestic and international antitrust academic communities regarding the qualitative determination of this behavior. Although China’s newly revised Anti-Monopoly Law has added principled provisions targeting data and algorithmic monopolies, concrete law enforcement practices still face systemic dilemmas such as the failure of market dominance determination, difficulties in obtaining concealed technical evidence, blurring of non-price competition damage quantification, and the applicability limitations of current legal provisions. To break through these conundrums, this paper advocates abandoning the traditional unilateral market framework and introducing “cross-market competitive influence” as a supplementary identification standard for dominant market position. Meanwhile, it suggests constructing a graded and classified dual-track regulatory system tailored for “super platforms” and “ordinary platforms,” introducing a normalized algorithmic auditing mechanism, and actively advocating a path that unifies external administrative regulation with internal compliance governance of platforms, aiming to provide systematic guidelines for the construction of the anti-monopoly rule of law in China’s digital economy.