空间的“遗忘”与“召回”——海德格尔对康德空间观的存在论解构与奠基

The “Forgetting” and “Recall” of Space—Heidegger’s Ontological Deconstruction and Foundation of Kant’s Concept of Space

摘要: 海德格尔对康德空间观的存在论解构，标志着空间问题从认识论范式向生存论范式的根本转向。在西方哲学空间概念的双重演进脉络中，康德将空间确立为“直观的形式”，奠定了知识论的先验基础，却也导致了空间存在论维度的“遗忘”。其“形式的直观”所引发的时空统一性疑难，更暴露出先验哲学的内在困境。通过对“先验想象力”的存在论阐释，海德格尔将这一悬置于感性与知性之间的能力，转化为时空统一性的存在论根基，使先验统觉得以向“此在”的生存论结构转化。在《存在与时间》中，“在之中”、“去远”与“定向”等概念共同构建起以操劳实践为特征的生存论空间观，完成了空间从认知形式向存在之境的哲学“召回”。

Abstract: Heidegger’s ontological deconstruction of Kant's concept of space marks a fundamental shift in the problem of space from an epistemological paradigm to an existential one. Within the dual evolutionary context of the concept of space in Western philosophy, Kant's establishment of space as the “form of intuition” laid the transcendental foundation for epistemology, yet it also led to the “forgetting” of the ontological dimension of space. The difficulty of the unity of time and space, triggered by his concept of the “form of intuitive understanding,” further reveals the inherent predicament of transcendental philosophy. Through an ontological interpretation of the “transcendental imagination,” Heidegger transforms this faculty, suspended between sensibility and understanding, into the ontological ground for the unity of time and space, enabling the transcendental apperception to be transformed into the existential structure of “Dasein.” In Being and Time, concepts such as “Being-in,” “de-severance,” and “directionality” collectively construct an existential concept of space characterized by practical concern, accomplishing the philosophical “recall” of space from the realm of cognition to the horizon of existence.