并购交易结构、控制权变更与企业盈余管理

M&A Transaction Structure, Control Right Change and Corporate Earnings Management

摘要: 企业并购过程中普遍存在信息不对称与业绩压力，易诱发管理层盈余管理行为。本文选取2009~2024年中国A股上市公司并购事件为研究样本，从交易类型、关联属性、控制权变更和交易规模四个维度，系统考察并购交易结构异质性对企业应计盈余管理的影响机制与影响效应。实证结果显示，不同并购方式对企业盈余管理行为的影响存在明显异质性：其中股权拍卖对盈余管理的正向促进作用最为显著，协议转让、发行股份购买资产、挂牌转让同样会显著推高企业盈余管理程度。进一步研究发现，关联并购与控制权变更均会加剧盈余管理行为，且控制权变更的影响效应更稳健；并购交易规模与盈余管理水平呈显著正相关关系，这一作用在发行股份购买资产、挂牌转让两类并购模式中表现得尤为突出。本研究不仅拓展了并购视角下企业盈余管理前置诱因的相关研究，也为资本市场甄别高风险并购行为、健全信息披露机制、加强关联并购监管力度提供了实证依据与理论借鉴。

Abstract: Information asymmetry and performance pressure are prevalent in corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which tend to induce earnings management behaviors among management teams. Using M&A events of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2024 as research samples, this paper systematically explores the influence mechanism and effect of heterogeneous M&A transaction structures on accrual-based earnings management from four dimensions: transaction type, related-party attribute, control right change and transaction scale. The empirical results indicate that different M&A methods exert heterogeneous impacts on corporate earnings management. Equity auction presents the strongest positive facilitating effect on earnings management, while agreement transfer, asset acquisition by share issuance and listing transfer also significantly raise the level of corporate earnings management. Further analysis reveals that both related-party M&As and control right changes intensify earnings management, and the impact of control right changes is more robust. Additionally, M&A transaction scale is significantly positively correlated with the degree of earnings management, and such effect is particularly prominent in asset acquisition by share issuance and listing transfer. This study enriches the research on the predisposing factors of earnings management in the context of M&As, and provides empirical evidence and theoretical references for the capital market to identify high-risk M&A activities, improve information disclosure systems and strengthen the supervision of related-party M&As.