洛克自然法理论中的权利与义务之争——基于对施特劳斯学派的反驳

The Debate between Rights and Obligations in Locke’s Theory of Natural Law—A Rebuttal to the Straussian School

摘要: 施特劳斯学派对洛克的自然法理论作了霍布斯式理解，认为自然状态中自然权利先于自然法的义务，只有当公共权威在场的情况下自然法的义务才具有效力。而洛克实际上通过借鉴“苏亚雷斯综合”，将个体的意志与上帝意志的奖惩联系起来，从而使得人们出于对彼岸奖赏这一“最大的善”的追求得以逻辑一贯地践行自然法原则。由此，这使得洛克区别于霍布斯，将自然法置于自然权利之先，从而为自然状态的普遍约束力提供了超验义务根基。

Abstract: The Straussian school offers a Hobbesian interpretation of Locke’s natural law theory, holding that in the state of nature, natural right takes precedence over the obligation of natural law, and that the latter becomes effective only when a public authority is present. Locke, however, by drawing on the “Suárezian synthesis,” links the individual will with the sanctions of God’s will, thereby enabling human beings, out of the pursuit of the “greatest good”—the otherworldly reward—to consistently follow the principles of natural law. This distinguishes Locke from Hobbes and places natural law prior to natural right, thus providing a theological foundation for the universal binding force of the state of nature.