基于复杂网络的电商平台商家漂绿行为演化 机制研究
Research on the Evolution Mechanism of Sellers’ Greenwashing Behavior on E-Commerce Platforms Based on Complex Networks
摘要: 在电商平台环境中,绿色标签与相关信息逐渐成为影响消费者决策的重要因素。然而,在信息不对称与识别成本较高的条件下,部分商家通过夸大宣传或符号性标识实施“漂绿”行为,从而获取额外市场收益,削弱平台治理效果。为刻画这一过程,本文基于复杂网络演化框架,构建了电商平台情境下商家绿色经营与漂绿行为的动态演化模型,引入消费者偏好、平台治理强度与处罚机制等关键因素,分析其对系统稳态结构的影响。研究结果表明:系统在多数情景下收敛至内部稳态,绿色经营与漂绿行为长期共存,难以实现完全绿色转型;平台治理强度与处罚力度能够显著提升绿色比例,但其作用呈现连续变化特征,缺乏明显阈值效应;消费者偏好对绿色转型具有阶段性影响,在较低水平下反而可能抑制绿色扩散,而在较高水平下发挥促进作用;平台治理与消费者偏好之间存在显著协同效应,仅依赖单一机制难以实现理想治理效果。本文从复杂网络视角揭示了平台生态中漂绿行为的结构性存续机制,并为电商平台绿色治理提供了理论依据与管理启示。
Abstract: In the e-commerce platform environment, green labels and related information have gradually become important factors influencing consumer decision-making. However, under conditions of information asymmetry and high identification costs, some sellers implement “greenwashing” behavior by exaggerating publicity or using symbolic labels, thereby obtaining additional market benefits and weakening the effectiveness of platform governance. To describe this process, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary model of sellers’ green operation and greenwashing behavior in the context of e-commerce platforms based on a complex network evolutionary framework, and introduces key factors such as consumer preference, platform governance intensity, and penalty mechanisms to analyze their effects on the steady-state structure of the system. The results show that the system converges to an internal steady state in most scenarios, where green operation and greenwashing behavior coexist in the long term, making it difficult to achieve a complete green transformation; platform governance intensity and penalty strength can significantly increase the proportion of green behavior, but their effects show continuous changes without obvious threshold effects; consumer preference has a stage-dependent impact on green transformation, which may inhibit the diffusion of green behavior at low levels but promote it at higher levels; there exists a significant synergistic effect between platform governance and consumer preference, and relying on a single mechanism is insufficient to achieve ideal governance outcomes. This paper reveals the structural persistence mechanism of greenwashing behavior in the platform ecosystem from the perspective of complex networks, and provides theoretical basis and managerial implications for green governance of e-commerce platforms.
文章引用:铁维帅. 基于复杂网络的电商平台商家漂绿行为演化 机制研究[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(7): 564-573. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.157793

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