基于三方演化博弈的区域巨灾保险市场风险 管控与工程治理稳定性研究

Research on Risk Management and Engineering Governance Stability of Regional Catastrophe Insurance Market Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game

摘要: 近年来，自然灾害频发对地方经济社会运行和居民财产安全造成持续影响，完善区域巨灾保险风险管控机制、提升工程治理体系稳定性具有现实意义。本文基于地方政府、保险公司和居民三方主体，构建演化博弈模型，分析严格监管、积极经营和参与保险三类策略之间的互动关系，并运用复制动态方程、均衡点稳定性分析和MATLAB数值仿真，探讨成本因素、奖惩因素和收益感知因素对系统演化路径的影响。研究表明，当政府严格监管收益、保险公司积极经营净收益和居民参保综合收益较高时，系统能够向“严格监管–积极经营–参与保险”的稳定状态演化；监管成本、经营成本和居民保费过高会削弱积极策略选择，而补贴、奖励、处罚和安全感收益提升能够促进系统稳定。研究可为区域巨灾保险制度优化、风险管控能力提升和工程治理稳定性建设提供参考。

Abstract: In recent years, frequent natural disasters have continuously affected local economic and social development and residents’ property security. Therefore, improving the operating mechanism of local catastrophe insurance markets and enhancing the stability of the engineering governance system are of practical significance. Based on the three main participants—local government, insurance companies and residents—this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the interactions among strict supervision, active operation and insurance participation. By using replicator dynamic equations, equilibrium stability analysis and MATLAB numerical simulation, this paper further explores the effects of cost factors, reward and punishment factors, and perceived benefit factors on the evolutionary path of the system. The results show that when the benefits of strict government supervision, the net benefits of active operation by insurance companies and the comprehensive benefits of residents’ participation in insurance are relatively high, the system can evolve toward the stable state of “strict supervision - active operation - insurance participation”. Excessive supervision costs, operating costs and insurance premiums may weaken the choice of positive strategies, while subsidies, rewards, penalties and improved sense of security can promote system stability. This study provides a reference for optimizing local catastrophe insurance systems, enhancing risk management capabilities, and building the stability of engineering governance.