日常论证中的预设谬误及其失效机制

Presupposition Fallacies and Their Failure Mechanisms in Ordinary Argumentation

摘要: 在日常论证与批判性思维体系中，对论证前提失效机制的分析具有核心的理论与应用价值。西方非形式逻辑中的“预设谬误”揭示了论证前提中因隐含不可接受或未经验证的假设，进而导致论证整体失效的逻辑机理。本文系统梳理了预设谬误的理论脉络，首先阐释了预设概念从语言哲学、语用学到论证理论的演进，明确了其作为隐性承诺对论证责任存储的操纵作用。随后，本文重点对复杂问语、窃取论题、虚假两难以及存在性预设四种核心谬误类型进行了深度的语用和语境解构，剖析了它们在论证推进中所体现的认知僭越本质。最后，本文总结了预设谬误的语境敏感性与语用导向特征，探讨了其作为策略性操纵工具对理性对话秩序的负面影响，并提出了基于批判性思维的消解路径。本研究深化了对非形式逻辑中前提评估体系的理解，为现代论证理论评价规范的建构提供了结构化的分析框架。

Abstract: The evaluation of argumentative premises constitutes a central concern in both everyday argumentation and critical thinking. Within the framework of informal logic, presupposition fallacies reveal how arguments may become defective when they rest upon implicit assumptions that lack adequate justification or acceptability. This paper examines the theoretical foundations and failure mechanisms of presupposition fallacies in everyday argumentative practice. It begins by tracing the development of the concept of presupposition from philosophy of language and pragmatics to contemporary argumentation theory, emphasizing its function as an implicit commitment that shapes the distribution of argumentative obligations. On this basis, the paper analyzes four representative forms of presupposition fallacies—loaded questions, begging the question, false dilemmas, and existential presuppositions—from pragmatic and contextual perspectives. The analysis shows that these fallacies operate by incorporating unexamined assumptions into discourse and thereby circumventing the requirements of rational justification. The study further highlights the context-dependent and pragmatically oriented character of presupposition fallacies and examines their potential to distort the procedural norms of rational dialogue through strategic manipulation. By clarifying the role of presuppositions in argumentative failure, this paper contributes to a more systematic understanding of premise evaluation in informal logic and offers a structured framework for the assessment of argument quality in contemporary argumentation theory.