股权集中度、融资约束与企业财务绩效——基于非线性中介效应的理论分析

Ownership Concentration, Financing Constraints and Corporate Financial Performance—A Theoretical Framework Based on Nonlinear Mediation Effect

摘要: 股权集中度和财务绩效之间存在着“利益协同”和“壕沟防御”这两种互相冲突的理论观点，已有的研究大多停留在直接效应的经验检验上，并且与“融资约束–财务绩效”这条研究脉络的对话仍显不足，缺乏在统一框架下对二者内在传导机制的系统刻画。本文从控制权私利和监督激励的权衡入手，建立简明的理论模型，得出股权集中度与财务绩效之间呈倒U型关系，并且把融资约束当作连接两者的重要中介渠道，股权集中度经由改变信息不对称状况以及第二类代理成本，从而对企业的外部融资溢价实施影响，进而对财务绩效造成非线性间接影响。在此基础上，本文提出了几个可以检验的理论假说，并对股权性质(国有和民营)对上述机制的影响做了情境调节的研究。研究为整合股权结构、融资约束和财务绩效三者之间的关系提供了一个统一的分析视角，对改善公司的治理结构、减少企业的融资约束有理论和政策上的意义。

Abstract: Ownership concentration and financial performance are linked by two conflicting theoretical perspectives—the “incentive-alignment” and “entrenchment” hypotheses. Most existing studies remain confined to empirical tests of the direct effect and have engaged only insufficiently with the “financing constraints - financial performance” line of research, lacking a systematic characterization, within a unified framework, of the internal transmission mechanism connecting the two. Starting from the trade-off between private benefits of control and monitoring incentives, this paper builds a parsimonious theoretical model and derives an inverted-U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance. It further treats financing constraints as a key mediating channel linking the two: ownership concentration influences a firm’s external financing premium by altering the degree of information asymmetry and second-type agency costs, thereby exerting a nonlinear indirect effect on financial performance. On this basis, the paper proposes several testable theoretical hypotheses and, through a contextual-moderation analysis, examines how the nature of ownership (state-owned versus private) affects the above mechanism. The study provides a unified analytical perspective for integrating the relationships among ownership structure, financing constraints, and financial performance, and offers both theoretical and policy implications for improving corporate governance structures and alleviating firms’ financing constraints.