新《公司法》背景下审计委员会的法律地位与职能研究
A Study on the Legal Status and Functions of the Audit Committee against the Background of the New Company Law
摘要: 新修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》在法律层面确立审计委员会制度,打破了我国长期以来单一的双层制公司监督模式。这一制度变革旨在破解传统监事会普遍存在的监督乏力、独立性缺失与专业能力不足难题,弥补其无法适配现代公司治理监督需求的缺陷。审计委员会制度以委托代理理论和信息不对称理论为核心理论支撑,同时借鉴了美国、英国等国家的成熟发展经验。新《公司法》明确了审计委员会的选择性与强制性适用规则,构建了涵盖成员构成与独立性要求、核心职权范围、议事运作机制,以及上市公司关键财务事项前置审查权的完整制度框架。审计委员会依托信息获取、专业能力与决策融合优势,拥有显著提升公司内部监督效率的潜力,但同时也面临独立董事独立性不足、管理层合谋风险及权责边界模糊等现实困境。只有通过强化独立董事选任与履职保障、细化权责边界、建立科学的履职评价与责任追究体系等配套机制,才能防止审计委员会陷入监事会的运行困境,切实发挥其财务监督与治理制衡的核心功能。
Abstract: The newly revised Company Law of the People’s Republic of China establishes the audit committee system at the statutory level, breaking the long-standing single two-tier corporate supervision model in China. This institutional reform aims to address the pervasive problems of ineffective supervision, lack of independence and insufficient professional competence in the traditional board of supervisors system, and remedy its inability to adapt to the supervision demands of modern corporate governance. The audit committee system is underpinned by the core theories of Principal-Agent Theory and Information Asymmetry Theory, while drawing on the mature development experience of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The new Company Law clarifies the optional and mandatory application rules for audit committees, and constructs a comprehensive institutional framework encompassing membership composition and independence requirements, core powers and functions, deliberation and operation mechanisms, as well as pre-approval authority over key financial matters of listed companies. Relying on its advantages in information access, professional expertise and decision-making integration, the audit committee has significant potential to improve the efficiency of corporate internal supervision, but it also faces practical challenges including insufficient independence of independent directors, the risk of management collusion and ambiguous demarcation of powers and responsibilities. Only through supporting mechanisms such as strengthening the appointment and performance protection of independent directors, refining the demarcation of powers and responsibilities, and establishing a scientific performance evaluation and accountability system can the audit committee be prevented from falling into the formalization predicament that plagued the board of supervisors, and effectively fulfill its core functions of financial supervision and governance checks and balances.
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