考虑积分交易的减排投入与积分调控策略研究

Study on Emission-Reduction Investment and Credit Regulation Strategies Considering Credit Trading

摘要: 针对“双积分”政策下政府政策参数优化与转型汽车制造商低碳转型管理决策问题，本文构建政府与转型汽车制造商的三阶段决策模型，分析积分交易条件下政策参数对制造商减排投入、产品定价、市场需求、利润和社会总福利的影响。研究表明，制造商最优减排投入具有分段特征，新能源汽车积分比例要求提高并不会持续增强对燃油车的减排投入，而会促使制造商在燃油车减排与新能源汽车积分获取之间重新配置资源；新能源乘用车积分值提高会降低新能源汽车价格、扩大市场需求并提高制造商利润；政府最优积分调控存在适度区间，其中积分比例要求主要影响燃油车减排投入与定价，积分值主要影响新能源汽车定价与需求；边际环境负效用的提高会提升最优积分比例要求并压缩制造商利润与社会总福利，消费者低碳偏好增强则会降低最优积分比例要求并改善制造商利润与社会总福利。研究结果从政策参数优化、制造商低碳转型决策与社会福利协调角度，为双积分政策管理和汽车制造商减排资源配置提供理论参考。

Abstract: To address policy parameter optimization under China’s “Dual-Credit” Policy and the low-carbon transition decisions of transforming automobile manufacturers, this study develops a three-stage decision model between the government and a transforming automobile manufacturer. It examines how policy parameters affect emission-reduction investment, product pricing, market demand, manufacturer profit, and social welfare under credit trading. The results show that the manufacturer’s optimal emission-reduction investment exhibits a segmented pattern. Increasing the new energy vehicle credit ratio requirement does not continuously strengthen fuel-vehicle emission reduction, but induces the manufacturer to reallocate resources between fuel-vehicle emission reduction and new energy vehicle credit acquisition. A higher credit value for new energy passenger vehicles reduces new energy vehicle prices, expands demand, and increases manufacturer profit. The government’s optimal credit regulation lies within an appropriate range: the credit ratio requirement mainly affects fuel-vehicle emission reduction and pricing, while the credit value mainly affects new energy vehicle pricing and demand. Moreover, higher marginal environmental disutility increases the optimal credit ratio requirement and reduces manufacturer profit and social welfare, whereas stronger consumers’ low-carbon preference has the opposite effect. These findings provide theoretical references for the management of the dual-credit policy and manufacturers’ emission-reduction resource allocation from the perspectives of policy parameter optimization, the manufacturer’s low-carbon transformation transition decisions, and the coordination of social welfare.