种粮农民一次性补贴政策对农户种粮积极性的影响研究

Research on the Impact of the One-Time Subsidy Policy for Grain Farmers on Their Planting Enthusiasm

摘要: 在农资价格持续波动和粮食安全约束趋紧的背景下，实际种粮农民一次性补贴政策成为稳定粮食生产预期、缓解农户成本压力的重要财政工具。本文以理性小农理论和公共政策激励理论为分析基础，结合重庆市统计局2022~2024年统计公报、公开政策文件以及既有文献中的农户调研资料，构建“成本补偿–行为响应–信号感知–执行精准度”的分析框架，并引入Logit/Probit模型设定讨论补贴对农户扩大或维持种粮面积决策的可能影响。研究发现：第一，重庆粮食生产总体保持稳定，2024年粮食播种面积为3047.87万亩，粮食总产量为1100.73万吨，说明政策评估的重点不在于宏观面积是否大幅波动，而在于微观主体的投入意愿和政策响应；第二，补贴对农资成本上涨的直接弥补能力有限，重庆样本中农户平均每亩成本增幅约为165元，平均每亩补贴约为30元，成本弥补率约为18.2%；第三，补贴对总体农户扩大播种面积的边际激励较弱，仅有10.5%的农户明确表示会因补贴扩大种植面积，但对经营规模较大的主体具有更明显的稳定作用；第四，补贴资金更多表现为收入补偿功能，超过73%的农户将其用于生活开支补充或偿还农资赊欠，收入效应强于生产要素替代效应；第五，政策的信号传导和预期稳定功能较为突出，约85%的农户认为补贴体现了国家对种粮主体的支持。基于此，未来应在动态补贴标准、实际种粮人识别、土地流转合同备案和补贴资金直达机制上进一步优化，以提高财政支农资金的边际使用效率。

Abstract: Against the background of persistent fluctuations in agricultural input prices and mounting food-security constraints, the one-time subsidy policy for actual grain farmers has become an important fiscal instrument for stabilizing grain-production expectations and easing farmers’ cost pressure. Grounded in rational peasant theory and public policy incentive theory, this study integrates the 2022-2024 statistical communiques of Chongqing, public policy documents, and farmer-survey information disclosed in existing studies. It constructs an analytical framework of cost compensation, behavioral response, signal perception, and implementation precision, and introduces Logit/Probit model specifications to examine the potential effects of the subsidy on farmers’ decisions to expand or maintain grain-sown area. The findings are as follows. First, Chongqing’s grain production remained generally stable: in 2024, grain-sown area reached 30.4787 million mu and grain output reached 11.0073 million tons, indicating that policy evaluation should focus less on large macro-level fluctuations in cultivated area and more on producers’ input willingness and policy responses. Second, the subsidy provides limited direct compensation for rising input costs. In the Chongqing sample, the average cost increase was about 165 yuan per mu and the average subsidy was about 30 yuan per mu, yielding a compensation rate of approximately 18.2%. Third, the marginal incentive for farmers overall to expand sown area is weak: only 10.5% of farmers clearly reported that they would expand planting because of the subsidy, although the policy has a more pronounced stabilizing effect on larger-scale operators. Fourth, the subsidy functions mainly as income compensation: more than 73% of farmers use it to supplement household expenditures or repay input-related debts, so its income effect is stronger than its production-factor substitution effect. Fifth, the policy’s signaling and expectation-stabilizing functions are more prominent, with about 85% of farmers believing that the subsidy demonstrates national support for grain producers. Accordingly, future policy should further optimize dynamic subsidy standards, identification of actual grain farmers, land-transfer contract filing, and direct-payment mechanisms, so as to improve the marginal efficiency of fiscal funds supporting agriculture.