《复性书》“诚”论与王阳明“良知”说——唐宋明心性本体的逻辑展开

“Cheng” in the Fu Xing Shu and “Liangzhi” in Wang Yangming—The Logical Development of the Ontology of Mind-Nature from Tang to Ming

摘要: 李翱《复性书》以“诚”建构心性本体，开启儒家内圣之学的形上转向；王阳明“良知”说则集宋明心性论之大成。本文梳理李翱“诚”体论的理论建构与内在困境，指出其“性善情恶”“灭情复性”路径陷本体与工夫于二分；继而追踪“诚”从周敦颐到陆九渊的形上化演进，揭示理学本体论的内在逻辑张力；最终阐明阳明以“良知”统合心性，在本体上融超越与内在为一，在性情上以“觉”统摄七情，在工夫上以“致”代“复”，完成了从“复性”到“致良知”的范式转换。这一演进脉络展现了儒家心性论从超越之体向当下之用的转向，其“即体即用”的思想资源对当代儒学发展仍具启示。

Abstract: In his Essay on Returning to Nature (Fu Xing Shu), Li Ao constructs the ontology of mind-nature through the concept of cheng (sincerity), thereby initiating a metaphysical turn in the Confucian learning of inner sageliness. Wang Yangming’s doctrine of liangzhi (innate knowledge), in turn, represents the culmination of the Song-Ming discourse on mind-nature. This paper first examines the theoretical construction and internal difficulties of Li Ao’s theory of cheng as substance, pointing out that his premises of “nature is good, emotions are evil” and the path of “extinguishing emotions to restore nature” result in a dichotomy between substance and practice. It then traces the metaphysical evolution of cheng from Zhou Dunyi to Lu Jiuyuan, revealing the inherent logical tensions within the Neo-Confucian ontology. Finally, it demonstrates that Wang Yangming, by unifying mind and nature through liangzhi, achieves three integrations: on the ontological level, he merges transcendence and immanence into one; on the level of nature and emotions, he subsumes the seven emotions under awareness (jue); and on the level of practice, he replaces “restoration” (fu) with “extension” (zhi), thus completing a paradigm shift from “restoring nature” to “extending innate knowledge” (zhi liangzhi). This evolutionary trajectory reveals a turn in Confucian doctrine of mind-nature from a transcendent substance to immanent function, and its intellectual resource of “substance and function as one” still holds relevance for the development of contemporary Confucianism.