心灵的功能主义解释：因果角色定义及其非还原转向

The Functionalist Account of Mind: Causal-Role Definition and Its Non-Reductive Turn

摘要: 功能主义作为20世纪下半叶心灵哲学的主流范式，主张心理状态的本质由其因果功能角色决定，而非特定的物理实现。本文系统梳理了功能主义因果角色理论的发展脉络与内在张力，在此基础上，重点考察了查默斯对功能主义的批判性修正。本文认为，功能主义从“纯因果角色定义”到“因果角色 + 现象属性”的理论演进，揭示了物理主义解释意识的根本困境，也为心灵哲学的跨学科建构提供了重要启示。

Abstract: As the dominant paradigm in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century, functionalism contends that the essence of mental states is determined by their causal-functional roles rather than specific physical realizations. This paper systematically sorts out the developmental lineage and internal tensions of the causal-role theory within functionalism. On this basis, it focuses on David Chalmers’ critical revision of functionalism. This paper argues that the theoretical evolution of functionalism from a “pure causal-role definition” to a framework integrating “causal roles and phenomenal properties” lays bare the fundamental predicament faced by physicalism when accounting for consciousness, and also yields crucial insights for the interdisciplinary construction of the philosophy of mind.