基于舞弊菱形理论的舞弊动因与治理研究——以海外上市国内经营的R企业为例

Research on the Motivations and Governance of Fraud Based on the Fraud Diamond Theory—A Case Study of Enterprise R Operating in China and Listed Overseas

摘要: 国内资本市场对外开放持续推进，不少本土消费企业借助协议控制模式(可变利益实体，Variable Interest Entity)登陆海外市场，国内外监管标准割裂、底层经营数据难以全面核验的制度短板持续显现，中概股财务舞弊风险随之上升。现有研究大多只依靠舞弊事发前短期财务数据分析成因，很少结合企业整改后的长期数据做纵向对比，专门针对门店收入造假的细分研究也较为有限。R企业收入舞弊事件，直观暴露了海外上市国内经营的连锁零售企业的治理缺陷。本文以R企业为例，运用舞弊菱形理论，并结合2021~2025年经营数据，对照舞弊虚增阶段与整改修复阶段的核心财务指标，分析资本与现金流压力、监管与核查漏洞、管理层自我合理化以及舞弊能力四类动因的协同作用。本研究旨在弥补现有案例的数据缺口，为企业内控优化、跨境监管协同治理提供实操参考。

Abstract: As China further opens its capital market, numerous local consumer brands go public overseas via Protocol Control Model (Variable Interest Entity). Cross-border inconsistent regulatory standards and barriers to full inspection of original business data create institutional flaws, lifting financial misconduct risks for Chinese concept stocks. Most prior studies analyze fraud causes only through short-term pre-scandal financial data, lacking long-run post-rectification longitudinal comparisons, and few target in-store revenue manipulation. Enterprise R’s revenue fraud fully reveals governance weaknesses of chain retail enterprises that are listed overseas and operate domestically. This paper adopts the fraud diamond theory, taking Enterprise R as the case. With 2021~2025 operational statistics, it compares core financial metrics of the inflated-earning period and post-rectification stage and analyzes the synergistic effects of four types of motivations: capital and cash-flow pressure, regulatory and verification loopholes, management self-rationalization, and motivation for fraud. It fills prior research gaps in data and perspective, providing feasible references for corporate internal control optimization and cross-border regulatory coordination.