董事催缴出资规则适用困境与优化路径
The Dilemma and Optimization Path of the Application of the Rules of Directors’ Call for Capital Contribution
摘要: 认缴资本制下股东“认而不缴”问题突出,2023年《公司法》第51条确立的董事催缴出资制度虽为资本充实提供了新的规制路径,但该条款在适用情形、程序规范与责任认定等方面存在模糊之处,导致司法裁判分歧明显。董事催缴义务的法理基础,在于勤勉义务的积极属性与董事经营管理职能的内在契合,由董事承担催缴职责具有正当性。当前,该制度主要面临三重困境:一是适用情形认定不一;二是催缴程序规则缺失;三是责任性质、构成要件与责任承担方式模糊。完善该制度,应从类型化建构、程序规范与责任认定三个维度展开:将催缴适用情形扩张至抽逃出资、出资不实与出资加速到期;构建以持续性核查、董事会决议、书面催缴与宽限期限制为核心的程序体系;以侵权责任四要件为框架统一责任认定标准,明确补充赔偿责任形态与董事内部差异化分配机制,以实现债权人保护与董事履职积极性的平衡。
Abstract: Under the subscribed capital system, the problem of shareholders “subscribing without contributing” is particularly acute. Although Article 51 of the Company Law establishes a director’s capital contribution demand system that provides a new regulatory pathway for capital enrichment, this provision remains ambiguous with respect to applicable circumstances, procedural norms, and liability determination, resulting in significant divergence in judicial adjudication. The legal foundation for directors’ capital contribution demand obligations lies in the affirmative nature of the duty of diligence and its inherent alignment with directors’ managerial functions, rendering it legitimate for directors to assume such demand responsibilities. At present, this system faces three principal dilemmas: first, inconsistent determinations of applicable circumstances; second, the absence of procedural rules for capital contribution demands; and third, ambiguity regarding the nature of liability, constitutive elements, and modes of liability assumption. To refine this system, efforts should proceed along three dimensions—typological construction, procedural standardization, and liability determination: expanding the applicable circumstances of capital contribution demands to include capital withdrawal, false capital contributions, and accelerated capital contribution maturity; constructing a procedural framework centered on continuous verification, board resolutions, written demands, and grace period limitations; and unifying liability determination standards under the four-element tort liability framework, clarifying the form of supplementary compensation liability and differentiated internal allocation mechanisms among directors, so as to achieve a balance between creditor protection and directors’ enthusiasm in performing their duties.
文章引用:付倩兰, 屠小娇. 董事催缴出资规则适用困境与优化路径[J]. 社会科学前沿, 2026, 15(8): 45-53. https://doi.org/10.12677/ass.2026.158634

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